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feasibility of border tax adjustments designed to reduce global 
greenhouse gas emissions and how they might confl ict with 
existing WTO multilateral rules.
With the WTO’s Doha Development Round stalled and 
the world’s economies struggling to resume growth, we must 
remember that although international trade and investment 
is an integral part of the global economy, it is a mere subset 
within the overarching goal of sustainable development. This 
issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy seeks to con-
tribute to the understanding of important developments in 
international trade and investment and encourage further inte-
gration of sustainable development principles into existing and 
future frameworks. For only with the proper balance and rec-
ognition of both the environment and development, and their 
connection with trade and investment, can sustainable develop-
ment be realized.
Paulo A. Lopes  Melissa Blue Sky
Editor-In-Chief  Editor-In-Chief
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Over the past fi fty years, international trade and invest-ment has grown considerably and connected country economies worldwide. So too have the legal frame-
works created to coordinate such activity: from the creation of 
the fi rst bilateral investment treaty in 19591 to the more than 
2,700 in existence today,2 the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) in 1995, and over 200 regional trade 
agreements currently in force.3 While much attention focused 
on international trade and investment starting in 2008, as the 
U.S. fi nancial crisis led to a global trade collapse, impacts of 
international trade and investment outside of the economic 
realm, in particular on sustainable development, are growing in 
recognition. Countries are beginning to integrate environmen-
tal standards into free trade and international investment agree-
ments, the WTO and United Nations Environment Programme 
collaborated on a trade and climate change report,4 the World 
Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation released its 
revised Sustainability Framework for private sector develop-
ment projects in May 2011, and after the 2007-2008 surge in 
food prices and resulting private purchases of land in develop-
ing countries, concerns of “land grabbing” have been raised.
Articles in this issue on Trade, Investment, and Sustainable 
Development review some of the defi ciencies and imbalances 
of existing trade and investment agreements while propos-
ing solutions to help counter and mitigate these issues. One 
author focuses on the issues concerning the health, safety, and 
environmental measures and whether the non-discrimination 
standards in investment treaties require consideration of these 
measures. Another author reviews the issues pertaining to the 
U.S. trade policy and how it can be used to advance global food 
security goals as opposed to hindering them. Next, an article 
analyzes the often highly secretive and confi dential foreign 
investment contracts in the oil and gas sector, with a focus on 
the environmentally relevant clauses in these contracts. While 
another article addresses measures being taken to strengthen 
environmental and social sustainability in China’s overseas 
investments and considers whether Chinese institutions could 
learn from other institutions. Lastly, an article reviews the 
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InTroducTIon
The approach of building mutually supportive trade, investment, and environmental regimes finds inspira-tion in the concept of sustainable development. Indeed, 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development recognized that 
trade and investment are necessary tools for achieving the goals 
of sustainable development.1 Economic activities may contribute 
to the progressive realization of human rights and environmen-
tal protection by fostering economic development, employment, 
income generation, and general welfare. This potential contribu-
tion is not automatic, however, as non-sustainable investments, or 
unwarranted interpretations of trade and investment disciplines, 
may defeat such general welfare goals by exposing the popula-
tion to health risks, causing environmental harm, or reducing the 
necessary policy space for sustainable development.
While its exact legal nature and status remain the object of 
controversy, at a minimum, sustainable development requires the 
integration of environmental issues in decision-making regard-
ing development and investment projects.2 If sustainable devel-
opment requires the integration of environmental considerations 
in the planning and implementation of economic activities, it 
follows that the resolution of economic disputes concerning 
health, safety, and environmental (“HSE”) measures should also 
be integrated into the various fields involved. This process of 
integration in dispute settlement places an emphasis on treaty 
interpretation and, particularly, an emphasis on the principle of 
systemic integration codified in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.3 In this regard, sustainable development calls 
for a process of normative dialogue, and the interpretive prin-
ciple of systemic integration guides the conversation.
The interpretation and application of substantive invest-
ment disciplines carries intense implications for the policy space 
available to governments to adopt measures conducive to sus-
tainable development. If compensation by the host government 
to the investor is required for the adoption of such measures, 
“even where regulatory action is taken in a fair and equitable 
manner, the potential cost to the governments may well discour-
age desirable or necessary environmental regulations.”4 This 
general issue is particularly relevant in disputes concerning the 
relative non-discrimination standards of most-favored nation 
(“MFN”) treatment and national treatment (“NT”) because nor-
mal regulatory activity hinges on the construct of categories and 
distinctions that underlie differentiated approaches and rules 
attaching to particular persons, products, substances, economic 
sectors, etc.
This paper analyzes key issues concerning the scrutiny of 
HSE measures under the non-discrimination standards. It first 
introduces the non-discrimination standards and then examines 
the thorny questions of discriminatory intent and like circum-
stances. The paper argues that the construct of relative non-dis-
crimination standards in investment treaties does not incorporate 
“necessity” requirements to justify HSE measures, in contrast 
to Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Instead, 
the relative non-discrimination standards of MFN and NT allow 
for HSE considerations in their two core operative elements: “in 
like circumstances” and “less favorable treatment.”
The non-dIscrImInaTIon sTandards
The relative non-discrimination standards proscribe dis-
crimination on the basis of nationality. They require treatment 
no less favorable than that afforded to other national or foreign 
investors “in like circumstances.”5 The comparison of the treat-
ment afforded to similarly situated investors becomes the master 
key to the operation of the non-discrimination standards.
Given that the comparison process involves determining 
which investors are similarly situated, taking into account all rel-
evant circumstances, the operation of the standards is far from a 
mechanical application of a mathematical formula. Instead, the 
application of the non-discrimination standards calls for abstract 
legal reasoning and involves a measure of subjective assessment. 
Because of this, there is a degree of uncertainty involved in their 
operation, which may affect the policy space available to States.
Several questions are relevant to the interpretation of non-
discrimination standards through a sustainable development 
lens. For example: what is the meaning of “less favorable treat-
ment,” and is it established by disparate impact alone? Does the 
meaning of “in like circumstances” allow authorities to differen-
tiate among investors and/or investments on account of the dis-
similar HSE threats posed by different substances, production 
processes, geographical conditions, etc? If so, does like circum-
stances operate as an element of the non-discrimination stan-
inveStment agreementS & SuStainable Development:
the non-DiScrimination StanDarDS
by Marcos Orellana*
* Marcos A. Orellana, LL.M., S.J.D. is an attorney from Chile, Director of 
the Human Rights and Environment Program at the Center for International 
Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and Adjunct Faculty at the American University 
Washington College of Law, where he also serves as an Advisor to Sustainable 
Development Law & Policy. Elements of this article are based on prior works, 
including: Marcos Orellana, Science, Risk and Uncertainty: Public Health Mea-
sures and Investment Disciplines, in new aSpectS of international inveStment 
law 671 Phillippe Kahn & Thomas Wälde eds., Hague acaD. of int’l law, 2007.
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dards, or as an exception, which would transpose the necessity 
test of trade law into the investment regime?
This paper addresses the non-discrimination standards of 
MFN and NT together, since the focus of analysis is their rela-
tion to HSE measures. In trade law, by contrast, national treat-
ment rationales are not necessarily relevant to the interpretation 
of MFN disciplines,6 as MFN and “non-discrimination” are 
not necessarily synonymous.7 While differences between MFN 
and national treatment may be warranted in the trade regime, 
in the investment arena, both MFN and NT operate within the 
border with respect to largely similar issues. Both the Occiden-
tal case and the Cross Border Trucking case (examined below) 
have approached their analysis under the assumption that both 
the MFN and NT standards are synonymous, in the investment 
context.
dIscrImInaTory PurPose
Actual proof of discriminatory intent is generally not 
required as an element of discrimination.8 This does not mean 
that the purpose of an HSE measure is irrelevant, however. 
Account of purpose allows for proper consideration of the per-
spectives of both the investor and the State, including the public 
interest underlying HSE measures, and thus overcomes unidirec-
tional interpretations that consider investment obligations from 
the sole vantage point of the investor.9 Moreover, the purpose of 
the challenged measure is relevant since less favorable treatment 
is not established by disparate impact alone. In practice, national 
treatment claims arguing that any treatment that differentially 
affects a foreign investor, even if the difference is not attribut-
able to considerations of nationality, have not been successful.10 
If these claims were decided otherwise, the State would find 
itself unable to regulate in the public interest, with respect to 
processes or substances in a market dominated by foreign inves-
tors, without risking international liability, given that HSE mea-
sures would inevitably affect economic operators differently.
But how can tribunals determine the real purpose behind a 
measure? And, how should tribunals address situations of mixed 
intent, i.e., situations where a legitimate HSE objective co-exists 
with an impermissible motive? The difficulties involved in iden-
tifying regulatory purpose are compounded in the modern regu-
latory State, where legislatures and administrations respond to a 
number of often-competing interests, and where so much eco-
nomic and social activity is highly regulated. In light of the fact 
that States are hardly monolithic entities, the determination of 
protectionist purpose may become a formidable challenge to a 
discrimination claim or defense. The Methanex Tribunal, hear-
ing an arbitration involving groundwater contamination in Cali-
fornia, aptly expressed the problem:
In particular, decrees and regulations may be the prod-
uct of compromises and the balancing of competing 
interests by a variety of political actors. As a result, it 
may be difficult to identify a single or predominant pur-
pose underlying a particular measure. Where a single 
governmental actor is motivated by an improper pur-
pose, it does not necessarily follow that the motive can 
be attributed to the entire government. Much if not all 
will depend on the evidential materials adduced in the 
particular case.11
Several observations may be warranted in respect to the 
difficulties involved in identifying and proving intent. First, 
although in international law States may be said to express but 
one voice, democracies in practice respond to different, often 
competing, political interests. This political feature of democ-
racy is not to be condemned, especially when international law 
recognizes that democracy, human rights, and development are 
“interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”12 It may well be that 
different purposes co-exist and explain why a given measure was 
adopted.
In such cases, issues of mixed intent will introduce severe 
tensions between economic and HSE considerations. In this 
regard, once evidence reveals the existence of HSE risks, the 
parallel presence of illicit protectionist intent in some govern-
mental organ should not ipso facto render a measure illegal. 
If HSE risks are real, then the HSE protective purpose should 
in principle prevail over other purposes, given the paramount 
importance of safeguarding health, safety, and the environment.
Second, HSE measures cannot be presumed to be discrimi-
natory. On the contrary, where national authorities have applied 
due process and based their findings of risks and determination 
of the level of protection on the basis of available scientific evi-
dence, the specificity of HSE measures warrants qualified defer-
ence. It is for the claimant to prove discriminatory treatment, and 
not incumbent upon the government to demonstrate its public 
purpose. That said, the “smell test,” discussed below, the uncer-
tainties as to the location of the threshold involved in making a 
prima facie case, and the dangers of negative inferences should 
lead cautious governments to be forthcoming in adducing evi-
dence demonstrating the legitimacy of their HSE measures.
With regard to the evidence underlying a HSE measure, the 
country of origin of the scientific evidence is not necessarily a 
material reason for either accepting or rejecting it.13 The origin 
of the scientific evidence cannot sustain a presumption of dis-
criminatory intent because if it could, then most governments 
would risk attracting international responsibility for their efforts 
in assessing risks. Furthermore, the level of detail or specific-
ity required of the scientific evidence underlying HSE measures 
needs to take into account real world considerations and the sub-
stantial costs involved in producing a science-based analysis of 
the risks presented by the multiple substances, processes, and 
activities that interact in society. The burden on developing coun-
tries of producing tailored and specific scientific studies, in light 
of their limited budget for scientific research and more pressing 
priorities such as sanitation and food security, illustrates the ten-
sions surrounding the role of science in investment law.14
Third, in facing the challenges involved in determining pro-
tectionist intent, especially when considering facially neutral 
measures, tribunals are often tempted to adopt a “smell-test.”15 
The degree of circumstantial evidence pointing to protection-
ist intent may acquire a critical role, especially where direct 
evidence is unavailable. Thus, claimants will be drawn to 
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statements from different interests groups active in the political 
arena, figures on the expected benefits accruing to competitors 
in the marketplace, statements and memos from public officials, 
and any other piece of evidence that may serve to raise doubts 
as to the legitimacy of purpose. In S.D. Myers, which involved 
a ban on the export of hazardous PCB waste from Canada to 
the United States, the “smoking gun” tactic proved effective in 
convincing the tribunal that at stake was not a legitimate HSE 
measure, but rather a sham cover for protectionist purposes.16 In 
the Methanex case, the claimant even hired a private investigator 
to inspect the garbage of ethanol lobbying firms and to trespass 
into their offices.17
Fourth, resort to consistency and necessity could also pro-
vide indirect evidence of governmental intent. Such indirect 
evidence, however, only offers limited assistance because of the 
specific nature of HSE measures as well as the absence of actual 
obligations for consistency or necessity. Most often governments 
regulate in response to public perception of threats as they arise, 
and as scientific progress reveals what were until then “invisible” 
risks. Also, sustainable development calls for adaptive manage-
ment and evolving norms in order to incorporate new scientific 
insights and lessons learned regarding the operation and effec-
tiveness of legal tools. Thus, requiring overall consistency in 
levels of protection and attaching liability for failure to achieve 
consistency would have the law operate in fictitious conditions.
The parallel between Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) 
and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(“SPS”)18 of the WTO illustrates the different roles of harmo-
nization and consistency requirements in the trade and invest-
ment regimes. The protection of health in a society via sanitary 
measures that impede market access for goods that pose SPS 
risks will normally impose costs on other countries; to address 
this situation and secure market access to foreign goods, the SPS 
Agreement pursues harmonization of standards and even pre-
sumes conformity when international standards are utilized.19 
Investors and their investments, by contrast, are fully immersed 
in the diversity of national and local regulatory requirements, 
and it would have been quite far-reaching indeed if international 
investment agreements (“IIAs”) pursued harmonization of HSE 
standards across legal cultures and across differing levels of 
development.
With respect to necessity requirements, could less-trade 
restrictive alternatives provide indirect evidence of protection-
ist intent? In addressing this question, it must first be noted that 
the prerogative of countries to establish their levels of protection 
stems from their sovereignty, expressed in constitutional man-
dates to safeguard fundamental rights and to protect the popula-
tion, inter alia, from HSE risks and that these duties cannot be 
surrendered or abandoned.20 Second, countries are not obligated 
to justify their measures on the basis of necessity, absent explicit, 
conventional commitments to that effect. Third, any inquiry on 
less-trade restrictive alternatives should consider that reasonably 
available measures should achieve the same level of protection, 
involve the same regulatory costs, and restrict trade significantly 
less. Fourth, the textual differences between the SPS Agree-
ment, which explicitly refers to necessity,21 on the one hand, and 
non-discrimination disciplines in investment agreements, which 
do not usually include such requirement, on the other, must be 
given effect.
Fifth and perhaps decisively, in WTO law the remedy for a 
measure that offends the less-trade restrictive standard is ces-
sation, i.e., removal of the offending measure and adoption of 
the reasonably available less-trade restrictive measure.22 By con-
trast, investment treaties contemplate monetary damages as the 
remedy of choice, which highlights the need to avoid automatic 
transposition of trade law into the investment field. Thus, less-
trade restrictive criteria as indirect evidence is of limited value 
and could not by itself render sufficient light on illicit motive.
Therefore, arbitral tribunals inclined to employ less-trade 
restrictive criteria as indirect evidence should be careful not 
to transform them into a substantive necessity requirement. In 
claims involving trade and investment issues, the importation of 
a necessity test could involve investment arbitration adjudicat-
ing trade law claims, in excess of jurisdiction. Further, importing 
a necessity test into the non-discrimination standards in invest-
ment law would intrude much further into the regulatory auton-
omy of host States and potentially “lead to odd results.”23
Finally, with respect to “less favorable treatment,” the pur-
pose of a science-based HSE measure should prevail over NT 
or MFN claims, including de facto discrimination. A claimant 
alleging disguised protectionism in HSE measures will need 
to submit compelling evidence proving that the science is a 
sham, that no HSE risk exists, or that the government is operat-
ing solely for protectionist purposes. Admittedly, this is a high 
threshold. Still, the alternative could allow successful challenges 
to legitimate HSE measures, thereby compromising the abilities 
of governments to fulfill their environmental and human rights 
obligations.
LIke cIrcumsTances and non-dIscrImInaTIon
As the UN International Law Commission observed, even 
absent explicit reference to “like circumstances” or “like situa-
tions,” such comparative context is implicit in the essence of the 
MFN clause.24 The operation of “like circumstances” is not an 
easy task, however, given the elasticity of the terms and, thus, 
its ability to cast too wide or too narrow a net, depending on the 
level of abstraction or detail.
The application of non-discrimination standards raises dif-
ficulties where, as a result of local environmental conditions or 
the structure of a specific market, the operator that is treated or 
affected differently by the HSE measure is also a foreign inves-
tor. A hypothetical example presented by the United States Trade 
Representative in the context of the failed Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (“MAI”) clarifies the point:
One concern which was raised was the possibility that 
measures entirely consistent with MFN and national 
treatment may provide differing treatment to investors 
depending on the particular circumstance. For example, 
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a foreign investor whose investment is situated on a 
wetland may legitimately be treated differently than 
another foreign or domestic investor due to the loca-
tion of the investment, rather than the nationality of the 
investor. To address this issue, we included language in 
our proposal that would clarify the MAI’s definition of 
“in like circumstances,” in order to ensure that legiti-
mate environmental measures will not be challenged 
purely on the grounds of such differential treatment.25
The application of the non-discrimination standards to HSE 
measures raise at least two intertwined questions concerning the 
operation of the phrase “in like circumstances.” First, whether 
like circumstances operates as an exception to non-discrimina-
tion disciplines or alternatively as an operative element of the 
MFN and NT standards. Second, whether like circumstances 
refer only to operators in the same economic sector or whether 
it includes other differentiating criteria. In addition to these two 
questions, it remains open to question whether like circum-
stances could otherwise safeguard HSE measures that by design 
differentiate between investors on the basis of nationality.
like circumStanceS: an operative element or an 
exception?
Investment jurisprudence is divided as to whether “like 
circumstances” constitutes an operative element of the non-dis-
crimination standards or an exception that could justify differen-
tial treatment on policy grounds. Analysis of the Cross-Border 
Trucking case, concerning U.S. restrictions on cross-border 
trucking services as well as restrictions on Mexican investment 
in the U.S. trucking industry, is useful in approaching this issThe 
NT and MFN issues before the Cross-Border Trucking NAFTA 
Chapter 20 Arbitral Panel turned on the meaning and scope of 
the phrase “in like circumstances.”26 The Arbitral Panel sought 
guidance from other agreements that use similar language, such 
as the Canada-U.S. FTA. As the Panel noted, this agreement con-
tains an exception to NT in services trade,27 where “the differ-
ence in treatment is no greater than that necessary for prudential, 
fiduciary, health and safety, or consumer protection reasons,” and 
explicitly imposes the burden of satisfying the exception on the 
party according different treatment.28 The Panel then observed 
that the phrase “like circumstances” may properly include dif-
ferential treatment, under the conditions specified in the Canada-
U.S. FTA.29
Upon this reading of “like circumstances” and under the 
light of NAFTA’s trade liberalization objectives,30 the Panel 
reached the conclusion that the “in like circumstances” language 
constitutes an exception to the non-discrimination disciplines 
and should thus be interpreted narrowly.31 The Panel explained 
that “differential treatment should be no greater than necessary 
for legitimate regulatory reasons such as safety, and that such 
different treatment be equivalent to the treatment accorded to 
domestic service providers.”32
The Cross-Border Trucking Panel’s analysis highlights the 
difficulties involved in the operation of non-discrimination disci-
plines. In particular, the Panel’s reading of “like circumstances” 
as an exception to differential treatment could serve to avoid 
unreasonable results, considering that NAFTA’s investment 
chapter does not explicitly contain prudential exceptions for 
the protection of health, safety, and the environment that could 
justify departure from its substantive obligations, unlike trade in 
goods and services.33
Other NAFTA arbitral tribunals have confronted similar 
issues and adopted a similar rationale in the context of national 
treatment. The S.D. Myers Tribunal, for example, noted that the 
“assessment of like circumstances must also take into account 
circumstances that would justify governmental regulation that 
treat them differently in order to protect the public interest.”34
In a similar jurisprudential vein, the Parkering Tribunal 
considered environmental criteria in its application of the non-
discrimination standards.35 This case involved parking works 
and operations within the old city of Vilnius, Lithuania, which 
was protected by the UNESCO Convention concerning the Pro-
tection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.36 The inves-
tor claimed that other parking works and operations had been 
treated differently.37 The Parkering Tribunal applied a binary 
construct to the non-discrimination standard: it compared cer-
tain economic operators, on the one hand, and it examined the 
policy underlying the differential treatment, on the other.38 In 
this reading, the non-discrimination standard implicitly incorpo-
rates an exception for measures justified by legitimate govern-
mental policies.
It would appear at first sight that this formula could avoid 
excessive outcomes by taking into account HSE considerations 
to justify differential treatment. However, the practical effect of 
such reading reduces the policy space available to governments, 
as the meaning of “like circumstances” is narrowed down by the 
IIA’s economic objectives. Such a narrow reading of the object 
and purpose of IIAs risks frustrating mutually supportive trade 
and environment regimes, as the legitimacy of public policy 
goals is solely or predominantly evaluated through the lens of the 
investment liberalization goals. Moreover, by defining the pur-
pose of investment agreements as tools for protecting investors, 
all doubts and ambiguities are resolved in the investors’ favor. To 
overcome this apparent lack of balance, IIAs should be appreci-
ated as instruments for sustainable development—embracing its 
three pillars: economic, social, and environment—and properly 
placed in the broader international law universe.
The reading of “like circumstances” as an exception also 
suffers from deficiencies relating to scope and the burden of 
proof. In regards to the burden of proof, the interpretation that 
treats “like circumstances” as an exception requires the respon-
dent government to justify its regulations, relieving the applicant 
of establishing relevant, material facts and proving all the ele-
ments of its claim.39 Then in regards to scope, the “exceptional” 
formulation of “in like circumstances” hinges on “necessity” 
considerations, where arbitral tribunals run the risk of second-
guessing government regulators by testing potentially available 
least trade restrictive measures against investment liberalizing 
objectives. The deficiencies of such “exceptional” readings are 
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amplified by the complexity and dynamism of market structures, 
as well as by evolving scientific knowledge and changing social 
preferences in the modern regulatory State.
Instead, in the investment context, “like circumstances” 
should be read in light of its role as the key operative element 
of the non-discrimination standards, rather than as a defense, 
exception, or justification against MFN or NT obligations. In 
such role, “like circumstances” does not involve presumptions, 
narrow interpretations, or transfers in the burden of proof. Simi-
larly, such reading does not transpose the WTO necessity test 
into the operation of investment non-discrimination disciplines.
As an operative element of the standard, the “like cir-
cumstances” test requires the identification of all relevant cir-
cumstances that serve to distinguish among foreign investors, 
including HSE considerations. In that context, as clarified by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”), analysis of conditions of competition in specific eco-
nomic sectors provide a point of departure, but neither exhaust 
the task of establishing the category of actors that should be com-
pared, nor the policy objectives that can be taken into account to 
define relevant parameters for comparison.40 It appears that the 
objective relevance of the circumstances for each specific case 
seems to be the correct standard of reference,41 including cir-
cumstances pertaining to HSE risks. Particular circumstances 
with respect to HSE issues should constitute a valid basis for dis-
tinguishing among otherwise similar investments or investors.42
Reading “like circumstances” as an operative element of 
the NT and MFN standards would do greater justice to the text 
and context of IIAs and would have positive systemic effects. 
This reading would not presume discrimination in the face of 
differential treatment or effects. Furthermore, this reading 
would also avoid a mechanical transposition of WTO law and 
jurisprudence into IIAs, both of which are different treaties with 
different parties, history, practice, text and context, structure, 
obligations, and remedies, thereby also avoiding the application 
of a goods analysis, or a services analysis, to investment 
matters. Finally, the scope of like circumstances would not be 
narrowed by the sole consideration of trade and investment 
objectives, thereby contributing to building mutually supportive 
environment and investment regimes.
The GAMI Tribunal confirmed the role of policy consider-
ations in the determination of “likeness,” and not as an “excep-
tion” to non-discrimination disciplines:
The Arbitral Tribunal has not been persuaded that 
GAM’s circumstances were demonstrably so “like” 
those of non-expropriated mill owners that it was 
wrong to treat GAM differently. The Government may 
have been clumsy in its analysis of the relevant criteria 
for the cutoff line between candidates and non-candi-
dates for expropriation. Its understanding of corporate 
finance may have been deficient. But ineffectiveness 
is not discrimination. The arbitrators are satisfied that 
a reason exists for the measure which was not itself 
discriminatory. That measure was plausibly connected 
with a legitimate goal of policy (ensuring that the sugar 
industry was in the hands of solvent enterprises) and 
was applied neither in a discriminatory manner nor as a 
disguised barrier to equal opportunity.43
Following the reasoning of the GAMI Award, differential 
treatment based on HSE considerations would not be on the 
basis of nationality, but on the basis of legitimate regulatory 
objectives. This rationale applies with particular force with 
respect to HSE measures of general application. But what about 
HSE measures that call for differential treatment on the basis of 
the nationality of the investor?
Governmental measures implementing multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements (“MEAs”) may well have implications 
for the NT and MFN standards in IIAs.44 For example, an MEA 
allowing performance requirements to transfer environmentally 
sound technology might place greater burdens on a foreign as 
compared to domestic investors, and environmental controls 
arising out of the Clean Development Mechanism established 
under the Kyoto Protocol may require countries to discriminate 
between different categories of investors on the basis of nation-
ality.45 In these situations, is the phrase “in like circumstances” 
broad enough to safeguard nationality-based discrimination 
based on an MEA?
Markedly, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal presented a “like cir-
cumstances” formulation that purports to go beyond discrimi-
nation on the basis of nationality: “[a] formulation focusing on 
the like circumstances question, on the other hand, will require 
addressing any difference in treatment, demanding that it be 
justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to 
rational policies not motivated by preference of domestic over 
foreign owned investments.”46 Further, the Pope & Talbot Tribu-
nal explicitly noted that differences in treatment will presump-
tively violate the non-discrimination standards, “unless they 
have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) 
do not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign 
owned and domestic companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly 
undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA.”47
According to this reading, “in like circumstances” can safe-
guard HSE measures expressing rational government policies 
but not if HSE measures, by design, distinguish between inves-
tors on the basis of nationality. Thus, under this construct, MEA-
based requirements would fail the non-discrimination test.
This solution may not contribute to mutual supportiveness 
between investment law and international environmental law 
because it could frustrate the objectives of MEAs. Three alter-
native options provide for a solution whereby the MEA-based, 
nationality requirement can co-exist with the non-discrimina-
tion standards. First, “in like circumstances” could consider 
the fact that the HSE measure is based on an MEA. Second, a 
conflict of norms analysis could apply to the conflict between 
the investment norm and the MEA norm, giving priority to the 
MEA obligation on account of the lex specialis principle. Third, 
general exceptions for HSE measures, where available, could 
safeguard nationality-based distinctions effected by HSE mea-
sures pursuant to MEAs. These three options would not frustrate 
the objectives of investment law because the nationality-based 
8Spring 2011
distinctions would not be arbitrary or a disguise for an impermis-
sible motive. Further, their rational basis and legitimate policy 
goals are underscored by the fact that they have been established 
by the international community in an international treaty—the 
MEA—seeking solutions to global HSE risks.
in like circumStanceS & the relevant comparatorS
Then on the question of the determination of relevant com-
parators for the operation of the “like circumstances” test, the 
Occidental case, involving discrimination claims by an oil pro-
ducer against the application of Ecuadorean tax law, provides a 
platform for analysis.48 The key issue before the tribunal turned 
on the meaning of “in like situations.”49 Occidental argued that 
“in like situations” did not refer to companies in the same sec-
tor of activity, such as oil producers, but to companies that were 
engaged in exports, even if encompassing different sectors.50 
Occidental further argued that a number of companies involved 
in the export of flowers, mining, seafood products, lumber, 
bananas, and African palm oil were entitled to receive Value 
Added Tax (“VAT”) refunds and continuously enjoyed that ben-
efit.51 Ecuador responded that “in like circumstances” could not 
extend to sectors other than oil producers because the whole pur-
pose of the VAT refund policy was to ensure that the conditions 
of competition were not changed.52 Ecuador further noted that 
with respect to VAT refunds, all oil producers were treated alike, 
including the national State oil company, Petroecuador.53
The Occidental Tribunal found in favor of the claimant 
on the basis of thin reasoning and doubtful propositions, two 
of which will be noted here. First, the Tribunal noted that “the 
purpose of national treatment is to protect investors as com-
pared to local producers, and this cannot be done by addressing 
exclusively the sector in which that particular activity is under-
taken.”54 Such formulation is problematic, not least because it 
neglects the essence of non-discrimination principles in securing 
equal access to opportunity, particularly in respect to the condi-
tions of competition.55 Further, the public interest implications 
of such an unbalanced reading are readily apparent, including 
with respect to HSE measures, as governments will differentiate 
among different sectors for entirely legitimate reasons.56
A more balanced approach to non-discrimination has been 
elaborated by the OECD, a forum convening the most heavily 
regulated States in the world, in the context of the 1976 Dec-
laration on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises.57 In its 1993 interpretation of the NT standard included in 
the 1976 Declaration, the OECD observed that:
As regards the expression “in like situations”, the 
comparison between foreign-controlled enterprises 
established in a Member country and domestic enter-
prises in that Member country is valid only if it is made 
between firms operating in the same sector. . . . More 
general considerations, such as the policy objectives 
of Member countries, could be taken into account to 
define the circumstances in which comparison between 
foreign-controlled and domestic enterprises is permis-
sible inasmuch as those objectives are not contrary to 
the principle of National Treatment.58
A second doubtful proposition underlying the Occidental 
Tribunal’s extremely broad reading of “in like situations” relates 
to the linkages between disparate treatment and protectionism. 
The Occidental Tribunal noted that it was “convinced” that 
Occidental’s less favorable treatment, i.e., the fact that unlike 
flower exporters it was denied VAT refunds, was not the result 
of discriminatory intent.59 Without more, this statement equates 
disparate impact with discrimination, and this interpretation dra-
matically compromises a government’s ability to regulate in the 
public interest, including by way of differential and incremen-
tal policy approaches.60 In this regard, it may be useful to recall 
the attempt by the Chair of the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment Negotiating Group to put together a package of 
proposals to address member States’ concerns on the impact on 
regulatory autonomy of the NT and MFN standards:61
The fact that a measure applied by a government has a 
different effect on an investment or investor of another 
Party would not in itself render the measure inconsis-
tent with national treatment and most favoured nation 
treatment. The objective of “in like circumstances” is to 
permit the consideration of all relevant circumstances, 
including those relating to a foreign investor and its 
investments, in deciding to which domestic or third 
country investors and investments they should appro-
priately be compared.62
This approach is more nuanced and recognizes both the 
close link between discrimination and equal opportunity. It also 
recognizes the fact that a government may treat economic opera-
tors differently for entirely legitimate policy reasons.
concLusIon
The operation of the relative non-discrimination standards 
can penetrate deeply into the regulatory sphere of the State, since 
they require the State to adduce a coherent explanation of the 
relevant categories and distinctions underlying the content and 
scope of application of an internal measure. Policy rationales 
for disparate treatment can involve a number of public interest 
regulations, including with respect to the environment, health, 
and safety. In this regard, interpreting “in like circumstances” 
as an operative element of the non-discrimination standards in 
IIAs that accounts for all relevant circumstances relating to the 
investment, rather than as a narrow exception that transfers to 
the State the burden of justifying its policy preferences, contrib-
utes to preserving the policy space necessary for the exercise 
of governmental authority in respect of health, safety, and the 
environment. Thus, the interpretation of “in like circumstances” 
as an operative element of the non-discrimination standards 
ultimately contributes to building channels of dialogue between 
legal regimes relevant to sustainable development.
Endnotes: Investment Agreements & Sustainable Development 
on page 35
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InTroducTIon
To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bod-
ies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like 
ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer 
afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor 
can we consume the world’s resources without regard to 
effect. For the world has changed, and we must change 
with it.
—President Barack Obama1
More than any U.S. president in history, Barack Obama 
has focused public attention on global hunger and the need to 
bolster food production by small-scale farmers in developing 
countries. He championed this cause at the 2009 G-8 meeting 
in L’Aquila, Italy, where he called on world leaders to commit 
$20 billion to address food security, promising $3.5 billion from 
the United States.2 After a series of consultations among vari-
ous government agencies and civil society organizations, the 
Obama Administration launched the Feed the Future initiative in 
April 2010.3 This program emphasizes the importance of small-
scale farmers, especially women, in country-led programs and 
a multiagency “whole of government” approach to global food 
security.4
Conversely, trade talks are gaining new momentum. After 
a two-year lull following the collapse of the World Trade Orga-
nization (“WTO”) talks in 2008, G-20 leaders have called for 
a resumption of the negotiations in 2011, with WTO Director 
General Pascal Lamy calling for completion of draft modality 
texts by the end of March.5 The United States is also promoting 
its own ambitious agenda of regional and bilateral trade talks. 
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership continue to advance 
and to expand to even more countries in Southeast Asia.6 The 
U.S. and South Korean governments recently resolved remain-
ing differences over market access for automobiles in the United 
States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”).7 That agreement, 
along with pending bilateral agreements with Panama and 
Colombia, could be introduced for Congressional approval in 
2011.8
The food, finance, and climate crises are all evidence of how 
much the world has changed since the era of free trade accords 
began, but the U.S. agricultural trade agenda remains essentially 
the same as the approach first adopted in the 1990s under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).9 Recent 
reports of rising food prices and riots in some countries10 add 
new urgency to the imperative to get these policies right.
U.S. trade policy must start from our goals rather than our 
tactics. Ending global hunger, enhancing incomes and employ-
ment, and encouraging a transition to climate friendly agriculture 
should be the goals of U.S. agricultural, economic, and develop-
ment policy. Trade policy should be a tool to support those goals 
rather than a loose cannon that shoots them down.
From dumPIng To VoLaTILITy: The Lessons  
oF Trade LIberaLIzaTIon
Much of the international debate on trade and agriculture 
over the past decade has focused on U.S. (and EU) agricultural 
subsidies11 but have not addressed the systemic causes of dump-
ing, i.e., exporting at below the cost of production. Floods of 
cheap imports, especially during the harvest, can be devastat-
ing for developing-country farmers.12 As of 2003, dumping 
margins for U.S. commodity crops supported under the Farm 
Bill included wheat exports at an average price of twenty-eight 
percent below the cost of production, corn at ten percent, and 
rice at twenty-six percent below the cost of production.13 Today, 
recurring bouts of rising food prices have decreased the extent of 
dumping,14 but deregulated trade continues to present challenges 
for stable local food markets.
Over the last few decades, U.S. agricultural policy has 
changed from a system of supply management to one more 
dependent on free-market forces. This process culminated in the 
1996 Farm Bill, which removed the last vestiges of supply man-
agement and enacted policies to encourage farmers to increase 
the volume of production to compensate for lower prices, with 
a strong focus on creating new markets overseas for U.S. com-
modities.15 That system soon resulted in a series of crises in rural 
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areas and the enactment of emergency payments, later codified 
as the current system of agricultural subsidies.16
Commodity prices skyrocketed during 2007 and 2008, 
and farmers were better able to cover their costs of production, 
reducing counter-cyclical payments from the U.S. government 
to farmers, which rise to compensate farmers when prices are 
low for those crops.17 As a result of this increase in commod-
ity prices, U.S. agricultural subsidies dropped from more than 
twenty-four billion dollars in 2005 to just over twelve billion 
dollars in 2009.18 In many countries, locally grown food sud-
denly became cheaper than imports, but after decades of neglect 
of agricultural sectors, production levels were too low to be 
able to fully meet domestic demand.19 Concerns over dump-
ing have been overtaken by alarm over food-price volatility, as 
wild swings in prices make planning more and more difficult for 
farmers around the world.
The precise causes of the 2008 food price crisis and 
the recent bouts of price swings are still the subject of much 
debate.20 They include rising demand, extreme weather condi-
tions, and excessive financial institution speculation on com-
modity markets.21 New limits on commodity speculation in the 
United States and EU are imperative to decrease the wild price 
swings experienced in recent years.22 However, policymakers in 
developing countries also need new ways to manage trade flows, 
so they can rebuild fragile agricultural sectors.
Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides a telling exam-
ple of the dangers of this approach for food security and rural 
livelihoods. The agreement eliminated trade barriers for most 
sectors, with tariffs on corn and beans phased out over fourteen 
years.23 In fact, the Mexican government accelerated the tariff 
reduction schedule, and United States exports of corn to Mexico 
nearly quadrupled compared to the pre-NAFTA levels.24 Mexi-
can agricultural exports to the United States also increased at an 
average of ten percent a year,25 but the benefits of those sales 
did not trickle down to rural communities. Many Mexican farm-
ers were unable to compete with the cheap imports, and more 
than two million have left the agricultural sector since NAFTA 
began, a drop of nearly twenty-five percent.26 Since job creation 
in other sectors of the economy has been weak, rural poverty has 
increased and many people have been forced to migrate to cities 
in search of elusive manufacturing sector jobs or to the United 
States in search of better opportunities.27
There is little evidence that the growth in U.S. exports under 
NAFTA has helped family farmers in this country either. The 
number of Americans employed in agriculture has dropped since 
the agreement began (as has manufacturing employment).28 
The relationship between employment and trade is complex, 
even in the United States, as job creation from export growth 
can be offset by job losses resulting from imports that compete 
with domestic production. The kind of production also matters 
as large-scale agro-industrial production for export generally 
employs fewer people than smaller-scale, locally oriented pro-
duction. As smaller-scale producers have been forced to seek off-
farm income, larger producers and corporations have increased 
their share of production. Over the last twenty-five years, there 
has been a marked shift in the size of U.S. farms, with very small 
farms (with annual sales less than ten thousand dollars) and very 
large farms (sales exceeding one million dollars) increasing 
by thirty-eight and 243 percent, respectively.29 The number of 
small, but commercially viable farms (sales between ten and two 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars) dropped by forty percent, 
from half of total farms in 1982 to less than a third in 2007.30 
The percentage of U.S. agricultural production controlled by the 
top four firms in a given sector has increased substantially, rising 
from seventy-two percent of beef packing in 1990, for example, 
to 83.5 percent in 2005.31
Since NAFTA, U.S. agricultural production, both for 
domestic use and exports, has increased while rural employment 
and livelihoods have faltered. While a substantial portion of corn 
production is now directed to domestic ethanol production,32 
exports of corn, wheat, and other commodity crops have con-
tinued to grow.33 According to the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) estimates, agricultural bulk export vol-
umes increased eight percent in 2010 over 2009 levels, while the 
bulk export values increased seventeen percent.34
The recent surge in U.S. farm income is instructive. Net 
farm income increased twenty-six percent in 2010 over the 
2000–2009 average, triggered, according to some analysts, by 
rising exports.35 However, the USDA also notes that,
[a] second feature of the 2000–2009 decade is the high 
and persistent levels of volatility in agricultural com-
modity and input (feed, fuel, and fertilizer) markets. 
The volatility is reflected in the patterns of farm income 
during the decade. Net farm income increased in 6 of 
the 10 years, posting an average increase of 26.6 per-
cent in the years with increases in farm income and 
an average decline of 23.5 percent in the other years 
(2002, 2005, 2006, and 2009).36
These wild swings in prices and incomes destabilize rural 
communities and contribute to increasing corporate concentra-
tion. Whether in the United States or overseas, agricultural poli-
cies that stabilize prices at levels nearer the cost of production 
could provide consistent signals and incentives to help farmers 
stay on their land and produce stable food supplies.37
These problems are not unique to the NAFTA partners. 
In country after country, trade liberalization in agriculture has 
weakened local production and undermined rural livelihoods.38 
Women produce sixty to eighty percent of food in many devel-
oping countries.39 They are particularly vulnerable to the risks 
created by dumping and volatile markets, since their access to 
productive resources is often already precarious. The emphasis 
on agricultural exports in the 1990s tended to result in a shift 
away from food production for household consump tion, which 
tended to be controlled by women, to cash crops, which tended 
to be controlled by men.40 The U.S. Feed the Future initiative 
recognizes the vital importance of women’s contributions to 
food secu rity and would direct more resources to women farm-
ers.41 If the point of the U.S. global hunger policy is to improve 
food security and rural livelihoods for women and men, then 
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appropriate trade mechanisms also need to be in place to ensure 
that they can stay on their land.
Haiti is another stark example of how trade policies can 
undermine food security. As recently as the 1980s, Haiti pro-
duced eighty percent of the rice it needed for domestic consump-
tion.42 Under structural adjustment programs imposed by the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and United 
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), 
among others, Haiti lifted import controls and reduced public 
support to agriculture.43 Today, it imports eighty percent of its 
rice needs and receives substantial food aid for recurring food 
shortages.44
In March 2010, former President Bill Clinton testified to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the push to export rice 
to Haiti had been a grave mistake, stating:
Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy, 
until the last year or so when we started rethinking it, 
that we rich countries that produce a lot of food should 
sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the bur-
den of producing their own food, so, thank goodness, 
they can leap directly into the industrial era. It has not 
worked. It may have been good for some of my farmers 
in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. It 
was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not pointing 
the finger at anybody. I did that. I have to live every day 
with the consequences of the lost capacity to produce a 
rice crop in Haiti to feed those people, because of what 
I did. Nobody else.45
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that the U.S. government 
has in fact started to rethink this policy. The President’s 2010 
Trade Policy Agenda clearly stated the intention to expand U.S. 
exports, even to developing countries.46 While Least Developed 
Countries (“LDCs”) are not being asked to agree to any new 
commitments to reduce tariffs under the Doha Round, there is 
no indication that United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) 
is reconsidering the wisdom of the previous rounds of tariff 
reductions.
A better approach would be to explicitly exempt low-income 
food import-dependent countries from U.S. export promotion 
goals and to allow flexibility to establish tariff rates adequate 
to protect their vulnerable agricultural markets. The LDCs, as 
defined by the United Nations, include some forty-eight least-
developed countries, thirty-one of which are also members of 
the WTO.47 It includes such countries as Haiti, Senegal, and 
Bangladesh, many of which experienced food riots during the 
2008 price spike.48 The United States does not have free-trade 
trade agreements with any of these countries, so this would be a 
relatively simple first step.
A second step would be to more carefully consider poverty 
and hunger within middle-income countries. USTR has entered 
into a series of discussions with India, Brazil, South Africa, and 
China, both to enlist their support to restart the WTO talks, and 
to press them to liberalize their own markets.49 Each of these 
countries is unique, but they all face challenges in local food 
production. According to research prepared for the United 
Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) Human Develop-
ment Report, there are more poor people in India than in the 
twenty-six African countries combined,50 and suicides by farm-
ers who have lost their land are devastating evidence of the fra-
gility of their agricultural system.51
Developing countries in the G-33 have argued for WTO 
exemptions for Special Products and for the establishment of a 
new Special Safeguard Mechanism to protect food security and 
livelihoods and to advance rural development.52 While WTO 
members (including the United States) committed to the prin-
ciple of protecting local markets to advance food security at the 
2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, in practice this has been a central 
point of contention in the WTO talks.53 The G-33’s insistence 
on these mechanisms (as well as United States intransigence on 
subsidies) was one of the key factors in the collapse of the WTO 
talks in 2008.54 A better approach would be to work with devel-
oping countries to consider the best ways to implement these 
mechanisms and other necessary measures to advance food 
security goals over export promotion.
The Trade ruLes needed To resPond To 
cLImaTe and Food crIses
Agriculture has always been subject to unpredictable 
weather patterns, pests, and diseases. These risks are exacer-
bated by climate change, which is already causing changes in 
growing seasons and increases in droughts and flooding.55 These 
effects will become more frequent and more devastating in years 
to come,56 making it even more important to support flexible and 
innovative new approaches in developing countries. Efforts to 
strengthen local agricultural production in ways that respond to 
these challenges and benefit local communities and plans to fos-
ter regional cooperation in times of crisis are critical.
National and regional coordination of food reserves is 
emerging as an important tool to confront volatility in food sup-
plies. The UN Comprehensive Framework for Action on the 
Global Food Crisis (a multiagency effort to coordinate donor 
policies) recognizes the importance of reserves.57 Reserves and 
other measures to limit price volatility and supply availability 
will be at the center of the agenda at the May 2011 G-20 Agri-
culture Ministers summit and the fall Committee on World Food 
Security meeting.58
Several groupings of countries are already taking action to 
implement regional reserves systems. “In March 2010, Brazil, 
Russia, India and China (the BRIC nations) agreed to support the 
establishment of a system of national grain reserves.”59 In Octo-
ber, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) plus 
Japan, China, and Korea committed to establish a regional emer-
gency rice reserve, building on a pilot program that has been 
operating for several years.60 In December, West African nations 
meeting in the Club du Sahel explored proposals to coordinate 
national food reserves systems to assist each other in cases of 
crop failures or other crises.61
A system of food reserves does not replace international 
trade, but it can be an important means to stabilize national 
and regional food supplies. Food reserves can be supported or 
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constrained by trade rules that govern public support to agricul-
ture. WTO rules and U.S. trade policy discourage public man-
agement of food supplies, but there is some degree of flexibility 
that would not prevent countries from starting to implement 
such programs.62 Food reserves do require public support to buy 
and sell stocks. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture limits how 
much governments can spend to support agriculture.63 While the 
establishment of a grain reserve in the United States could raise 
overall support beyond those limits, developing countries would 
be unlikely to exceed the limits included under current rules.
Price bands could be a bigger issue for U.S. trade policy. 
Most reserves systems operate so that when prices reach pre-
determined floors or ceilings the government intervenes.64 If it 
has buffer stocks, it could release those reserves onto the market 
to reduce high prices or confront local food shortages. It would 
purchase grains when prices are low, particularly during the har-
vest. These price bands are often coordinated with trade policy, 
with tariffs on imports triggered when prices fall, and reduced 
when they rise. While WTO rules generally limit such measures, 
in practice, many developing countries have some degree of flex-
ibility in the application of tariff rates.65 Since many of them 
have agreed to bound tariff rates (ceilings) that are higher than 
the actual applied rates, they could utilize the difference in tariff 
rates (“water” in WTO lingo) to operate a price band and still 
comply with WTO rules.66 The G-33’s proposals for a Special 
Safeguard Mechanism would institutionalize price bands as a 
legitimate tool to combat volatility.67 USTR has argued against 
these measures at the WTO, pressing for reductions in bound 
tariff rates and opposing the G-33’s proposal for a Special Safe-
guard Mechanism.68 In negotiations for a US-Andean Free Trade 
Agreement, the United States insisted on the dismantling of 
the system of price bands established under the Andean Pact.69 
Those negotiations were later narrowed to a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and Peru, which liberalized all trade 
in agricultural goods and eliminated the Peruvian government’s 
participation in the regional price band.70
The conflicts between trade rules and food reserves could 
emerge in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(“TPP”). The TPP talks currently include Australia, Brunei, 
Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United 
States, and Vietnam.71 The Philippines, Canada, and Japan have 
also expressed interest in joining the talks.72 Brunei, Malaysia, 
Vietnam and the Philippines are also members of ASEAN and 
are participating in the Emergency Rice Reserve System, as is 
South Korea.73 Those talks should balance interests in expand-
ing trade with the measures needed to support food reserves and 
other elements of food security.
InTegraTIng nuTrITIon In Trade and 
deVeLoPmenT
Improving food security means increasing both the quantity 
of food available to local consumers and ensuring that its nutri-
tional quality is adequate. The administration’s Feed the Future 
initiative lists two central objectives: accelerating inclusive agri-
culture sector growth, and improving nutritional status.74 U.S. 
trade policy focuses on harmonizing food safety standards (both 
to generate new market opportunities and to ensure consumer 
safety),75 but it does not consider the nutritional value of the 
kinds of food systems encouraged by liberalization of trade and 
investment.
The debate on nutritional quality is already underway within 
the United States, where concerns about rising obesity rates and 
food safety have increased demand for organic foods and locally 
grown fruits and vegetables.76 There is a growing public rec-
ognition that Farm Bill supports for corn, soy, wheat, and rice 
have shifted diets towards processed foods and meats rather than 
healthier alternatives.77 U.S. trade policy should also reflect this 
new thinking in the kinds of food production encouraged by lib-
eralized trade and the innovations needed to improve nutritional 
outcomes.
Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides some impor-
tant lessons. Since the agreement’s inception in 1994, Mexi-
can imports of corn and soy used for animal feed, as well as 
of processed snack foods, soda and other foods characteristic 
of unhealthy diets, have skyrocketed.78 Liberalization of trade 
and investment rules has also spurred sharp increases in U.S. 
investment all along the Mexican supply chain, including food 
processing, supermarkets and fast food restaurants.79 Obesity 
rates in Mexico have risen to rates similar to those in the United 
States.80 Among OECD countries, Mexico is now tied with 
the United States for the highest per capita obesity rates in the 
world.81 The phenomenon of increasing malnutri tion occurring 
at the same time as over-nutrition is escalating in many countries 
around the world as people just above the poverty line consume 
increasing amounts of meats, processed foods and other rela-
tively low-cost, high-calorie foods.82
The United States cannot legislate consumer demand in 
other countries, but it could assure that its trade policy does not 
preclude governments from implementing changes in local food 
systems to improve the quality of food available to consumers. A 
government might decide, for example, to procure fresh food for 
anti-poverty programs from local farm cooperatives rather than 
importing it from a multinational corporation (along the lines of 
Brazil’s successful Zero Hunger program).83 Depending on how 
the government has listed the implementing agencies in its trade 
commitments, these kinds of programs could conflict with pro-
curement rules that aim to prevent discrimination against foreign 
suppliers.84
Some types of food security programs could also be the 
target of investor lawsuits. Like nearly all U.S. trade agree-
ments and bilateral investment treaties, NAFTA allows foreign 
investors to sue governments for compensation for regula tory 
changes or programs that undermine their expected profits.85 
One section of the investment chapter bans certain “performance 
requirements” on foreign investors, including the requirement to 
achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content in pro-
duction.86 Thus, for example, if the Mexican government were to 
require tortilla manufacturers in Mexico to use a certain percent-
age of locally grown (and more expensive) corn in their produc-
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tion, U.S. companies that own tortilla operations there could sue 
for compensation.
Most trade agreements include recourse to state-to-state dis-
pute resolution.87 The investor-state provision allows companies 
to bypass that mechanism, as well as local court systems, to sue 
governments directly.88 Most environmental, labor, and other 
public-interest groups have argued against this provision in most 
bilateral trade agreement the United States has negotiated since 
NAFTA.89
These concerns are not just theoretical. The U.S.-based Met-
alclad corporation was awarded $15.6 million in compensation 
when it sued the Mexican government over a local community’s 
refusal to reopen a toxic waste facility.90 A subsidiary of the 
U.S.-based Bechtel corporation sued the Bolivian government 
when it cancelled the privatization of a water distribution system 
in the wake of widespread public protests over excessive user 
fees.91 In 2010, Phillip Morris filed an investor-state suit against 
the Uruguayan government over rules on health warnings on cig-
arette packages.92 Even when such suits are unsuccessful, they 
have a chilling effect on local efforts to balance public interests 
with private profits.
Some trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties 
include tentative first steps that could start to address that imbal-
ance. The United States-Peru FTA, for example, establishes 
some general exceptions for measures designed to protect pub-
lic health, safety and the environment, but these exceptions do 
not apply to the chapter on investment.93 This kind of exception 
should be applied more broadly to specifically exempt public 
interest laws from challenges.94
Unfortunately, current U.S. trade policy seems to be headed 
in the opposite direction, affirming the Bush era approach. News 
reports indicate that the United States is pressing Australia, 
which refused to include the investor-state provision in its FTA 
with the United States, to reconsider that position in the talks 
for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.95 The recently signed US-Korea 
FTA resorts to the old approach as well, with only limited excep-
tions to protect the public good.96
recommendaTIons
Ultimately, the U.S. government should take a compre-
hensive set of acts that will alleviate these problems. It should 
review provisions in existing trade agreements that undermine 
food security and launch a process to reform them.97 The admin-
istration should explicitly exempt Least Developed Countries 
from U.S. export-promotion goals, and work with developing 
countries to establish trade rules that support price bands and 
other mechanisms to promote stable food supplies. On an inter-
governmental level, it should support proposals at the WTO and 
in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership for Special 
Products and Special Safeguard Mechanisms to advance food 
security and rural livelihoods in developing countries. Lastly, the 
United States could establish exceptions to investment and pro-
curement provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other 
ongoing bilateral trade negotiations to protect public health and 
food security.
concLusIon
Rather than continuing with the same tired approaches 
used in recent decades, it is time for a truly twenty-first century 
approach to trade policy, one that starts with a clear commitment 
to strengthening food systems and rural livelihoods in the South 
and North. It is not enough to consider changes in trade balances 
or growth in exports in particular sectors. We must examine how 
those changes affect our societies and environments, both in the 
North and South.
The 2008 food price crisis led to a reexamination of agri-
cultural development policies and the conclusion that decades of 
neglect of public investment in the sector had been a mistake.98 
President Obama took a leadership role in the 2009 G-8 meeting, 
committing to scale up food security spending and calling on 
other countries to do the same.99 The Feed the Future initiative 
and increases in U.S. government spending on food security are 
evidence of a commitment to redress that mistake and chart a 
new course to decrease global hunger.
Sadly, that effort will likely collide with the administration’s 
push to double U.S. exports and negotiate new trade agree ments 
along the same lines as the past. Spending to increase produc-
tion by smallholder farmers will be undercut by floods of U.S. 
exports. Efforts to establish food reserves could be undercut by 
trade rules that restrict governments’ abilities to manage sup-
plies.100 Programs to encourage consumption of healthy, locally 
grown foods could collide with investor protections that fail to 
balance public and private interests.101 Decades of expansion of 
agricultural exports have not helped U.S. farmers either. Farm 
incomes have been on a rollercoaster ride that has thrown farm-
ers overboard, increasing corporate concentration.102 There is no 
reason to expect that expanding the same failed policies of the 
past will have better outcomes now.
Instead, trade and food security policy should focus on 
rebuilding local food systems in the North and South. This does 
not mean abandoning trade or closing markets, but considering 
ways to ensure that trade complements, rather than substitutes 
for, local food production. The U.S. government should work 
with developing countries to determine the best ways to struc-
ture price bands and other trade protections to achieve food 
security and development goals, rather than blocking progress 
on these new approaches.
Added to the evidence of the past is the challenge of the 
future. Climate change and the end of cheap oil is a dispositive 
factor in determining food security and trade policy.103 Innova-
tive new approaches that build on local knowledge to reduce 
reliance on agro chemicals and imported inputs are not just excit-
ing, they are imperative.104 Trade and development policies must 
create the necessary policy space for these innovations rather 
than insisting on the extension of twentieth century models of 
industrial agriculture and dependence on imports.
Endnotes: Making U.S. Trade Policy Serve Global Food 
Security Goals on page 36
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As the global market faces the challenge of responding to climate change, including how to convert to a green economy that uses renewable resources, it is critical 
to examine domestic and international legal frameworks impli-
cated at various points in the life cycle of metallic ore resources 
employed in “clean” or “green” technology.1 Although the 
products themselves may or may not be environmentally-sound 
because of their source production or their transformation into 
waste at the end of their life, consumer demand for the green 
labeling will continue to drive the production of such technol-
ogy.2 International law and policy frameworks must take into 
account the consequences of environmental “solutions” by 
negotiating protective measures against the pollution created 
at various stages of the life cycle of these metals and creating 
incentives to induce responsible trade practices to prevent a 
“race to the bottom” by governments willing to mine, process, 
and ultimately dispose of spent materials.
Lithium and a suite of metals in the lowest rows of the 
periodic table, called rare Earth elements, are valuable in a 
wide range of industrial and commercial applications, includ-
ing emerging green technologies.3 In nearly all stages in the life 
cycle production of these metals there are energy intensive and 
polluting processes used, from mining and smelting to recycling 
and waste management.4 Furthermore, global climate change 
concerns drive how various metals are supplied, used, and ulti-
mately regulated.5 Trade in the raw materials used in green 
technology is, for better or worse, spurred by and responding 
to technological solutions that are perceived as tools to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Against a global backdrop of increasing trade in particu-
lar metallic resources,6 at the domestic level, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulates hazardous 
air pollutants under various mandates found in the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”).7 The EPA’s use of the CAA has come under increas-
ing scrutiny and attention in regard to the authority to regulate 
carbon dioxide,8 but the CAA has long served as the vehicle for 
regulating other pollutants with transboundary effects, includ-
ing some metals, and current proposed rulemaking demonstrates 
this commitment.9
At the international level, various treaties address the long-
range air pollutants related to particular industrial sources.10 
The United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) treaty 
negotiations on mercury and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (“UNECE”) Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (“LRTAP”) offer frameworks to 
the lurking coStS oF green technology 
metalS in a global market
by Winfield J. Wilson*
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address energy production and specific industrial processes, 
but are not universally-recognized, nor does either framework 
address the market for the metals used in green technology.11
While U.S. and international regulations address some of 
the issues presented by trade in the metals demanded by green 
technology, none are adequate. Investment and development in 
extracting and marketing the rare Earth elements are growing, 
predominantly in Asia, where industrialization and the availabil-
ity of many of these commodities allow for this rapid expan-
sion.12 China dominates as the world leader in rare Earth supply, 
processing, and export, but competition is springing up in other 
countries, including Malaysia13 and the United States.14
The global trade in metals, including the rare Earth ele-
ments, requires further international and multilateral negotia-
tion to promote the development of this industry in a socially 
and environmentally responsible manner. A bilateral agreement 
may be particularly appropriate to address the issue between the 
United States and China. China is both the largest producer and 
consumer of rare Earth metals; the United States is the next larg-
est direct consumer, as well as the primary indirect consumer 
through imports of products made with the metals from China.15 
In other words, U.S. demand for electronic technologies pro-
duced by China plays a crucial role in the global market for these 
metals. Therefore, it is only appropriate that the United States 
play an equivalent role in mitigating the environmental effects 
for which it is directly and indirectly responsible.16
On a broader and more comprehensive “cradle to grave” 
approach for rare Earth metals, a multilateral agreement may be 
appropriate and timely.17 A multilateral approach will allow for 
the integration and harmonization of international oversight and 
regulation of the global market’s supply and demand of these 
metals, keeping their environmental footprint in step with other 
multilateral environmental agreements. It is time for the interna-
tional negotiations on climate change, hazardous and radioactive 
waste management, and long-range air pollution to be reconciled 
with the global markets’ response to them, particularly in regard 
to the suite of useful but potentially damaging metals used in 
green technology.
Endnotes: The Lurking Costs of Green Technology Metals in a 
Global Market on page 38
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InTroducTIon
The Deepwater Horizon tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, which resulted in the largest ever accidental marine oil spill,1 was a stark reminder of the environmental 
risks posed by the oil and gas industry. Although disasters on 
this scale are fortunately rare, the average oil and gas operation 
has many other commonplace, yet significant, environmental 
impacts throughout its lifespan. Environmental issues begin with 
exploration activities—seismic tests, used to locate petroleum, 
often disturb local wildlife—and carry on to the end of the pro-
duction phase when facilities must be dismantled and disposed 
of.2 The everyday operation of many offshore petroleum instal-
lations involves the discharge of oil-contaminated “produced 
water,” drill cuttings and mud, and production chemicals.3 
Onshore, land clearing for base camps, helipads, roads, pipe-
lines, waste disposal sites, and other facilities has a considerable 
ecological impact.4 Furthermore, the industry is a significant 
contributor to air pollution and a major emitter of greenhouse 
gases. In 2008, thirty-two companies in the International Asso-
ciation of Oil and Gas Producers (“OGP”) reported emissions of 
296 million tonnes (metric tons) of carbon dioxide, 2.1 million 
tonnes of methane, 1.1 million tonnes of non-methane volatile 
organic compounds, 366 thousand tonnes of sulfur dioxide, and 
827 thousand tonnes of nitrous oxides.5
The industry faces increasingly strict environmental stan-
dards in developed countries such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom.6 However, the majority of the world’s proven 
oil reserves are in developing countries and economies in transi-
tion, which often lack sophisticated regimes for environmental 
protection.7 Even when legislative frameworks are well devel-
oped, there are often deficiencies in capacity and an unwilling-
ness to monitor and enforce environmental regulation.8 There is, 
furthermore, no comprehensive global convention on the envi-
ronmental impacts of petroleum exploration and production.9 
Although a number of multilateral and regional agreements 
cover certain aspects of the industry, they require adoption into 
domestic legislation to have a direct effect on international oil 
companies (“IOCs”).10
Apart from domestic and international law, one could also 
look at conditions attached to loans and investment insurance, 
as well as voluntary corporate social responsibility codes as 
sources of environmental standards for the petroleum industry.11 
However, the intent of this article is to shine a light on a much 
less studied and poorly understood domain of environmental 
regulation: the foreign investment contracts signed between 
IOCs (or consortiums of IOCs) and host states, which allocate 
rights to explore for and exploit hydrocarbons within an area of 
land (or an offshore block) over a fixed period of time.
In a 1994 monograph, Zhiguo Gao noted that environmen-
tal issues had “not received enough attention” in the oil and gas 
contracts he had reviewed.12 His conclusion raises the question 
of whether environmental issues have received greater atten-
tion in more recent oil and gas contracts (i.e. those negotiated 
and signed in the last fifteen years). This question is difficult to 
answer, not least because foreign investment contracts gener-
ally are not disclosed to the public.13 Many governments’ model 
agreements are publicly available,14 but it should be noted that 
these models may be substantially altered or ignored altogether 
in the negotiation of actual contracts.15
In this article, sample clauses from forty-one upstream oil 
and gas contracts (both onshore and offshore) covering thirty-
five countries and the period 1994-2008 were reviewed. Four-
teen of the contracts were models.16 An effort was made to 
find the most up-to-date model contracts, as governments peri-
odically revise them. However, it should be noted that some of 
the models were undated. The twenty-seven signed contracts 
reviewed were from twenty-six different countries17 and had an 
average signature date of 1999. Some of contracts in the sample 
are available on the Internet, either because governments have 
chosen to release them or because they have been leaked to non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) that have subsequently 
published them. Others are available in company filings to the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Given the small number of contracts that were reviewed, and 
the great variety of clauses that were encountered, nothing can be 
extrapolated from this preliminary survey about the frequency 
with which any particular type of clause is likely to appear in oil 
and gas contracts. Furthermore, in any given situation, a contract 
should be considered within the broader context of a country’s 
petroleum law, environmental law, and other domestic legisla-
tion. The purpose of the article is not to provide a full picture of 
environmental regulation of petroleum operations in individual 
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countries, but instead to draw attention to how contracts can 
either bolster or undermine environmental protection efforts.
TyPes oF ForeIgn InVesTmenT conTracTs
There are three main types of foreign investment contracts 
in the upstream oil and gas sector: (1) concessions or licenses; 
(2) production sharing contracts (or agreements) (“PSCs” or 
“PSAs”); and (3) risk-service contracts. In addition, all three 
may be subject to association or joint-venture agreements.18 
Under concession contracts and licenses, IOCs are often given 
exclusive rights to explore for and produce hydrocarbons and in 
return are required to pay royalties, taxes, and fees to the govern-
ment.19 In a PSC, the IOC has similar rights, but obtains only 
“cost oil” and a share of any “profit oil” produced, with the state 
recouping the remainder in lieu of, or sometimes in addition to, 
collecting royalties.20 The IOC also pays taxes and fees.21 Under 
a risk-service contract the IOC explores for and produces petro-
leum on behalf the government and is paid a fee for its services, 
with a possible right to buy a portion of the production.22 Asso-
ciation or joint venture agreements involve IOCs partnering with 
host governments or state-owned enterprises and, as in a PSC, 
sharing petroleum production.23
In practice, these forms and labels tend to be much less 
important than the specific content of a contract.24 However, 
one relevant difference is that unlike a typical concession, an 
IOC’s costs are generally recoverable under a PSC in the form 
of “cost oil.” 25 If costs associated with remediating and com-
pensating for environmental harm are “cost recoverable,” then 
the host government, not the IOC, would assume the risk of such 
costs.26 A similar issue may arise with risk-service contracts and 
even with concessions that have royalty rates that are somehow 
indexed to costs.
enVIronmenTaL sTandards cLauses
Most, though not all, of the oil and gas contracts reviewed 
contained a section on the environmental standards to be applied 
to the project. In this regard, there are five general forms that 
contracts appear to follow:
(i) reference to domestic environmental law only;
(ii) reference to international industry standards only;
(iii) reference to both domestic law and international  
 industry standards;
(iv) reference to domestic law and/or industry  
 standards and international environmental  
 agreements; or
(v) development of project-specific environmental  
 standards.
Some reference to domestic environmental legislation is 
clearly desirable from a public policy perspective. Domestic 
standards have been developed (in most cases) under a demo-
cratic system of rule, have often been designed with local envi-
ronmental conditions in mind, are familiar to the agencies that 
are tasked with monitoring and enforcement, and are in the pub-
lic domain. However, as noted previously, in many developing 
countries environmental regulation of the oil and gas sector is 
still in its infancy and it may be inadequate in some situations.27 
As such, reference in contracts to domestic legislation alone may 
be undesirable. In any event, it would appear that parties rarely 
adopt this form. A contract from Peru28 and one from Algeria29 
were the only contracts in the sample that referred solely to 
domestic environmental legislation.
In several of the contracts in the sample, the parties instead 
included a reference to international industry standards and 
failed to mention the application of domestic environmen-
tal law.30 The advantage from an environmental perspective 
of referring to international industry standards is that in some 
cases, they may be higher than, or cover specific issues not 
addressed in, domestic legislation. Furthermore, reference to 
international standards allows some scope for change and evolu-
tion of the environmental management regime of an investment 
over time, thus providing a way around a contractual require-
ment for stability, as will be discussed below. However, there are 
serious problems with referring only to industry standards, given 
their inherent ambiguity. The terminology “good oilfield prac-
tices”31 or “good production practices”32 is frequently employed 
in environmental standards clauses, as well as in other types of 
provisions discussed further below, but these phrases are seldom 
defined.33 A 2002 Cambodian contract provides a rare example 
of a definition:
Good Petroleum Industry Practices means the standards 
and practices, and exercise of that degree of skill, pru-
dence and foresight that would reasonably be expected 
of persons carrying out international petroleum opera-
tions, and adherence to generally accepted standards of 
the international petroleum industry, including sound 
environmental provisions.34
It is not at all clear where exactly one should look for “gen-
erally accepted standards” as there are a multitude of potential 
sources. For example, members of the American Petroleum Insti-
tute (“API”) “pledge” to manage their businesses according to a 
set of eleven environmental principles.35 However, the majority 
of these principles are imprecise, such as the commitment “to 
reduce overall emission and waste generation.”36 The API also 
has guidelines for environmental protection in both onshore 
and offshore oil and gas operations, although they are not freely 
available to the public.37 Other potential sources include guide-
lines produced by the previously mentioned OGP,38 the Austra-
lian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association,39 as well 
as bodies such as the International Organization for Standard-
ization (“ISO”).40 As Wawryk notes, the existence of so many 
guidelines in the petroleum industry makes it impossible to point 
to one that can definitively be considered “good” practice and 
furthermore the “actual practices of international oil companies . 
. . vary from company to company and, for one company, across 
jurisdictions . . . making it difficult to identify the best practices 
actually in use.”41
The majority of contracts reviewed for this article contained 
reference to both domestic environmental law and international 
industry standards. In most cases, there was no mention of how 
these two sources of standards would be reconciled in the event 
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of a conflict. However, in some contracts a form of hierarchy was 
established. For example, Article 21.1 of Brazil’s 2001 Model 
Concession Contract indicates that industry standards are only 
intended to act as a supplement to domestic legislation:
The Concessionaire shall adopt, at its own cost and 
risk, all the necessary measures for the conservation of 
reservoirs and other natural resources and for the pro-
tection of the air, soil and water in the surface or in the 
subsurface, subject to Brazilian legislation and rules 
about environment and, in their absence or lack, adopt-
ing Oil Industry Best Practice in this regard.42
In contrast, the clause below, from a 1994 Azerbaijani con-
tract, has evidently been adopted to ensure that domestic envi-
ronmental regulation is not more stringent than international 
industry standards:
Contractor shall comply with present and future Azer-
baijani laws or regulations of general applicability with 
respect to public health, safety and protection and res-
toration of the environment, to the extent that such laws 
and regulations are no more stringent than the then 
current international Petroleum industry standards and 
practices being at the date of execution of this Contract 
those shown in Appendix IX, with which Contractor 
shall comply.43
In addition to domestic law and industry standards, some 
oil and gas contracts refer to international environmental agree-
ments, although this does not seem to be a common practice. One 
example is Article 6.5 of Liberia’s Model PSC, which states that: 
“The Contractor further undertakes to carry out all petroleum 
operations in accordance with the Environmental Protection 
and Management Laws of Liberia and all international environ-
mental practice.”44 It is questionable whether such a sweeping 
reference to international environmental law will have anything 
more than symbolic value. Provisions in multilateral environ-
mental agreements are not only typically “soft” in nature; they 
also generally require adoption in domestic legislation before 
they can have any impact on private actors.45 Furthermore, few 
environmental agreements tackle specific issues concerning the 
management of petroleum exploration and production. However, 
there are some treaties covering marine pollution that are rel-
evant to offshore operations.46 In this respect, Mauritania’s 1994 
Model PSC is less ambiguous in its reference to international 
environmental law, noting in Article 6.6 that:
The Contractor shall take ail [sic] necessary precautions 
to prevent pollution of the marine area of the Explora-
tion Perimeter and observe, inter alias, the provisions 
of the International Convention on the prevention of 
petroleum pollution of sea waters signed in London on 
May 12, 1954 and the amendments and texts enacted 
for the implementation thereof.47
The final form of standards clause observed in the sample, 
although only in one contract, is the development of a proj-
ect-specific environmental regime. A 1996 contract between 
Azerbaijan and a consortium of investors stipulates that the con-
tractor, the state-owned oil company, and the State Committee 
on Ecology and Control over the Use of Natural Resources will 
jointly agree on a set of safety and environmental standards 
based on “(i) international petroleum industry standards and 
experience with their implementation in exploration and pro-
duction operations in other parts of the world and (ii) existing 
Azerbaijan safety and environmental legislation.”48 Once devel-
oped, this set of standards can only be altered through a written 
agreement and if any standards that have not been agreed upon 
are applied to the project, the investor can invoke the contract’s 
stabilization clause.
sTabILIzaTIon cLauses
According to a 2008 study, the use of “stabilization clauses” 
in host-government contracts “is widespread across industries 
and regions of the world.”49 Stabilization clauses come in vari-
ous forms.50 In their most basic form, they “freeze” the law that 
applies to the investment at the time the contract is signed.51 A 
more nuanced version is often referred to as an “economic equi-
librium” clause, which requires the government to restore the 
balance of risks and rewards established in a contract when it is 
upset by a new regulation or tax.52 A stabilization clause can be 
strictly circumscribed to only cover very specific issues, or the 
parties to the contract can explicitly “carve out” areas such as 
environmental protection from its application. For example, in a 
1997 contract from Kazakhstan, the stabilization clause contains 
the caveat:
provided, however, that no amendment to this Agree-
ment shall be required hereunder as the result of (i) 
changes to Laws concerning health, safety or environ-
mental protection that cause such Laws to be consistent 
with international standards for health, safety or envi-
ronmental legislation and are applied on a non-discrim-
inatory basis . . . .53
As Lorenzo Cotula notes, this provision is weakened by its 
ambiguous reference to “international standards,”54 but it is still 
far preferable to the stabilization clauses found in many con-
tracts and even in model agreements that are worded in such a 
broad manner that they can stifle any future regulation that might 
be perceived to undermine the profitability of an investment, 
including efforts to address corruption, to safeguard human 
rights (including labor rights), and to protect the environment.55
enVIronmenTaL ImPacT assessmenT cLauses
Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”) and corre-
sponding management plans have become a staple requirement 
for investment projects in many sectors.56 Unfortunately, a recent 
survey of environmental governance in petroleum producing 
countries commissioned by the World Bank found that “much 
of the emphasis of the EIA process appears directed towards 
the approval of oil and gas projects, rather than to a life cycle 
approach for minimizing environmental and social impact.”57
An EIA is typically mandated to be completed after a con-
tract with the state has been signed58 and most of the contracts 
reviewed for this article contained some reference to the need 
for an EIA. However, the form of the EIA clauses varied widely 
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across the sample from a simple note of the existence of a 
requirement,59 to detailed specifications of what the EIA should 
cover, who should prepare it, when it should be submitted, and 
so forth.60
cLauses on access To ProTecTed areas
Petroleum operations are particularly contentious when 
they are located, even partially, within wildlife reserves, parks, 
or areas of cultural or biological significance.61 NGOs have 
long argued that such areas should be off limits to the extrac-
tive industries,62 but most governments are not ready to forgo 
the potential economic opportunities that the exploitation of 
these areas offer. This is evident in several of the contracts in the 
sample. For example, Article 37.6 of Madagascar’s 2006 Model 
Offshore PSC states:
In the event that a portion of the Contract Area is 
located within a natural reserve area, the Operator shall 
deploy the necessary efforts in order to minimize the 
negative impacts on these natural reserves, in accor-
dance with generally accepted environmental practices 
in the international petroleum industry.63
This is an incredibly weak provision. A 2004 PSC from 
Uganda is similarly permissive, but it also contains a bizarre 
caveat:
In the event of protest from responsible concerned third 
parties within or outside Uganda regarding the conduct 
of Petroleum Operations in any National Park or Game 
Reserve and the consequent effects upon the environ-
ment or wildlife, the Government and Licensee shall 
meet to determine what if any action should be taken.64
Given that this clause provides nothing more than an obliga-
tion for the investor and the government to meet, it is question-
able why the parties bothered to include it at all.
cLauses on access To WaTer &  
oTher naTuraL resources
Petroleum operations require natural materials in their con-
struction phase, and significant amounts of water and electricity 
throughout their operation. While many operations are self-suffi-
cient in terms of energy supply, other natural resources may need 
to be obtained from within or outside the contract area.
From an environmental and community rights perspective, 
as well as from an economic-development perspective, it is dis-
turbing that many governments appear to focus solely on the 
potential revenue that they can obtain from petroleum produc-
tion and are willing to simply give away other valuable natural 
resources under the terms of oil and gas contracts. For example, 
Article 27.8 of Mozambique’s 2007 Model concession contract 
provides for the right of the investor “to drill for and have the free 
use of water and impound surface waters.”65 A contract from the 
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq is even broader, giving 
the contractor the right to “freely use sand, water, electricity, and 
any other natural resources located inside or outside the Contract 
Area for the Petroleum Operations.”66
Some of the contracts in the sample were completely silent 
on the issue of access to natural resources, and a small num-
ber had more nuanced provisions than those quoted above. For 
example, a 1994 contract from Ethiopia states that the contrac-
tor shall “have the right, subject to the approval of the Minister, 
to use water in the Contract Area for operational purposes, but 
the Contractor shall not deprive any land, domestic settlement 
or livestock watering place of the water supply to which they 
are accustomed.”67 A 2008 Model PSC from Bangladesh goes a 
step further by requiring that the contractor pay for the natural 
resources, such as water, that it utilizes.68
cLauses on gas FLarIng
The World Bank estimated in 2004 that the volume of asso-
ciated gas being flared and vented globally every year was about 
110 billion cubic meters—enough fuel to provide the combined 
annual natural gas consumption of Germany and France.69 
Although some short-term flaring during testing or in cases of 
emergencies is accepted as standard practice in the industry, the 
flaring of more substantial amounts of gas is only practiced in 
poor countries with limited infrastructure and weak regulatory 
institutions.70 Aside from being incredibly wasteful, flaring has a 
significant impact on local air quality and also makes an appre-
ciable contribution to climate change.71 At the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, the World 
Bank launched a Global Gas Flaring Reduction initiative to 
tackle the problem.72 Despite this development, and widespread 
condemnation of the practice, flaring continues in many states. 
In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP admitted to flaring 
18.6 tonnes of gas for every thousand tonnes of hydrocarbon that 
they produced.73
Many oil and gas contracts, even recent models, appear to 
be lenient on the issue of flaring. For example, the Bangladesh 
2008 Model PSC notes in Article 15.3 that:
Any Associated Natural Gas as is not used under Article 
15.1 or Article 15.2 and which Contractor does not con-
sider possible to recover economically shall be offered 
to Petrobangla without any payment to Contractor but 
at Petrobangla’s cost at the well-head or field facilities 
in the Production Area. To the extent that Petrobangla 
does not so take any of such Associated Natural Gas, 
Contractor may flare such Associated Natural Gas pro-
vided that such flaring is included in the Development 
Plan submitted under Article 8.10.74
Although this clause gives priority to utilization of the 
resource, there is no requirement for the gas to be reinjected 
into the ground if it is not taken by the state-owned enterprise, 
and economic concerns clearly trump environmental ones.75 A 
1997 contract from Indonesia also reflects this position in the 
statement that gas “may be flared if processing and utilization 
thereof is not economical.”76 Other contracts, such as a 2000 
contract from Belize77 and a 1998 contract from Angola,78 allow 
for flaring only if it is authorized by the government. A Ugan-
dan contract from 2004 also follows this model, but includes the 
caveat that the government’s consent “shall not be unreasonably 
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withheld or delayed.”79 The most stringent clauses, found in only 
a few contracts in the sample, restricted flaring to cases of an 
emergency or for safety reasons.80
cLauses on resPondIng To emergencIes  
and accIdenTs
In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP reported 2,978 
spills greater than one barrel in size, resulting in the release of 
18,266 tonnes of oil into terrestrial and marine environments.81 
In many of the oil and gas contracts in the sample, the parties 
have recognized that spills and other accidents and emergencies 
have the potential to occur and should be planned for. As such, 
as a part or separate from an EIA, an emergency response plan is 
often required from the contractor.82
Some oil and gas contracts also cover three additional ele-
ments in respect of emergencies: notification, response, and 
consequences for failure to respond. In the oil and gas contracts 
reviewed, notification was limited to the contractor apprising the 
government of the situation, but not the local community or the 
broader public.83 In terms of response, the requirements were 
often vague (e.g., “take prudent steps”) or simply provided refer-
ence to good oilfield practices.84 However, some of the contracts 
in the sample did additionally stipulate that in the event that the 
contractor did not act promptly to respond to an emergency or 
accident, the government had the right to mount its own response 
and charge the contractor for expenses that it incurred in doing 
so. An example is found in a PSC from Ghana:
If Contractor does not act promptly so as to control, 
clean up or repair any pollution or damage, GNPC 
[Ghana National Petroleum Corporation] may, after 
giving Contractor reasonable notice in the circum-
stances, take any actions which are necessary, in accor-
dance with accepted Petroleum industry practice and 
the reasonable costs and expenses of such actions shall 
be borne by Contractor and shall, subject to Article 
17.5 be included as Petroleum Costs.85
cLauses on LIabILITy, IndemnITy, & Insurance
Liability for environmental damage is an increasingly 
important issue for the oil industry. The dispute between Chev-
ron and the residents of the Ecuadorian Amazon concerning the 
company’s liability for oil pollution is a prime example of why 
most modern contracts have express provisions on liability that 
cover environmental damage.86
Issues of liability for environmental damage can be com-
plex, especially when multiple parties, including state-owned 
enterprises, are involved in petroleum production. Contracts, 
therefore, should have provisions that are explicit about who is 
to be liable for what and to whom. The issue of “who” depends 
somewhat on the form of contract, but generally it is the con-
tractor or concessionaire (the IOC) who will be liable, except in 
cases where fault can be directly attributed to the state or state-
owned enterprise.87 If there is more than one contractor involved 
in the project, then there will likely be a clause that stipulates 
that they are jointly and severally liable.88
The issue of “what” concerns the types of harms (e.g., only 
death or injury or also “damage to the environment”), the period 
in which the harms were caused (i.e. no liability for prior envi-
ronmental damage established in a baseline assessment), and the 
legal form of the liability (fault, strict, or absolute).89 Finally, on 
the issue of to “whom” the contractor is liable, there are typi-
cally two separate issues covered in contracts: liability to the 
state and liability to third parties. 90 In the latter case, the issue is 
not directly one of liability—contracts cannot affect the rights of 
third parties under national law—but rather one of indemnity.91 
Through indemnity clauses, IOCs commit to compensate states 
for any costs incurred resulting from a third-party liability suit.92
Most contracts in the sample made specific mention of 
“pollution” or “environmental damage” in liability/indemnity 
clauses and adopted a strict liability approach.93 However, a 
2002 Cambodian94 contract provided only for fault liability. The 
most developed liability/indemnity clause in the sample was 
from a contract signed by Belize in 2000, which required that the 
contractor contribute one tenth of one percent of the value of the 
gross annual production to a fund managed by the government 
“for the sole purpose of indemnification against any or all envi-
ronmental damages cause during the petroleum operations.”95
An additional issue closely related to liability and indemnity 
is the requirement for contractors to have insurance coverage. 
These clauses often specify that insurance should cover “pollu-
tion” or “environmental damage.”96 One potential problem with 
both liability/indemnity and insurance clauses is that the term 
“pollution” is quite narrow and does not cover all of the vari-
ous environmental impacts from oil and gas operations.97 Even 
references to “environmental damage” could be subject to inter-
pretation if not defined in the contract.
cLauses on decommIssIonIng & remedIaTIon
When an oil operation reaches the end of production, a 
number of costly activities must be undertaken. Onshore wells 
need to be plugged and structures dismantled, with materials 
removed and ultimately recycled or disposed of. Remediation of 
the local environment (e.g., decontamination and revegetation) 
may also be required. Offshore installations present particularly 
complex issues in terms of decommissioning, although it is also 
in this area that international law has its most direct and signifi-
cant impact on the oil and gas industry.98
The extent to which decommissioning is dealt with in con-
tracts depends somewhat on the contractual relationship between 
the parties and the expected life of the project. Under some 
arrangements, states retain ownership over production facilities 
and may continue operations after the termination of the con-
tract. However, even in such instances, there may be contractual 
provisions covering decommissioning of installations that are 
not destined to be taken over by the state.
Clauses on decommissioning and remediation found in con-
tracts in the sample were generally lacking in detail. For exam-
ple, a 1997 PSC from Benin states:
At the end of the Contract, in any other situation than 
the abandonment case, the Contractor must take the 
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measures according to the Good Practices of the Oil 
Industry to restore the environment and the sites where 
the Petroleum Operations have been performed to 
their original state on the Effective Date of the Con-
tract, taking into account the rules of the abandonment 
procedure.99
Although this provision appears quite strict, as it sug-
gests that sites should be restored to their “original state,” it is 
weakened by the generic reference to good oilfield practices.100 
According to a recent World Bank report, the absence of guide-
lines for what should be included in a decommissioning plan is a 
pervasive problem in petroleum producing countries.101
In addition to an absence of guidelines, there are obviously 
strong incentives for some companies to “cut and run” or to con-
duct only superficial remediation to minimize costs. One method 
for ensuring that decommissioning and remediation are carried 
out to plan is to use a financial mechanism such as a perfor-
mance bond or reserve fund. Tanzania is an example of a country 
that has set up such a regime in its 2008 Model PSC.102
concLusIon
Since Gao’s study was published in 1994,103 there have 
been significant changes in the content of upstream oil and gas 
contracts vis-à-vis environmental protection. The small sample 
of contracts reviewed in this article indicates that a significant 
number of clauses covering a variety of issues—from baseline 
environmental assessments all the way through to environmental 
remediation—can be found in modern contracts. Given the mon-
umental increase in environmental awareness and the intense 
scrutiny that the industry has come under in the two decades, 
this is unsurprising. What is remarkable is that a handful of con-
tracts still resemble those that Gao criticized for having only a 
token mention of environmental protection, and that references 
to ambiguous terms such as “good oilfield practices” remain so 
pervasive.
Further research will be required to build an understand-
ing of why there are such wide disparities in contracting prac-
tice between countries. For example, it would be interesting to 
explore whether the environmental provisions in oil and gas con-
tracts reflect domestic attention to these issues or if the capac-
ity of the government to negotiate with IOCs is a more relevant 
factor. Additionally, empirical work is required to determine the 
extent to which contract clauses on environmental issues are 
actually implemented by IOCs and monitored and enforced by 
governments.
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The United States relies heavily on the assertion that domestic coal reserves supply the nation’s electricity with a continuing secure energy source. The oft-cited 
figure that a 150 year supply of domestic coal is available often 
underlies the energy policy debate.1 While energy plan proposals 
suggest reducing dependence on foreign oil, “clean coal” tech-
nology remains the focus for electricity generation.2 However, 
a closer look at the types of coal available displays flaws in this 
simplistic view of total reserves. Massachusetts already imports 
over eighty percent of the coal used to produce the state’s elec-
tricity from other countries, primarily Columbia.3 The results 
of Massachusetts’ air quality regulations reveal how shifts in 
environmental regulations can make domestic coal too expen-
sive to compete in the market, even without serious regulation 
of greenhouse gases.4 Meanwhile, importing coal adds to the 
environmental and social problems of the countries that produce 
it. Environmental regulations need to catch up to the globaliza-
tion of markets and trade, or the air quality regulations designed 
to reduce power plant emissions and acid rain in Massachusetts 
may translate to polluted water and damaged land in Colombia, 
rather than a net global environmental improvement.5
Coal in the United States comes primarily from Western 
states, with Wyoming in the lead, and from Appalachia, the his-
toric coal mining region.6 Because of the long history of coal 
mining in Appalachia, the best and most accessible coal is gone, 
making mining more expensive and the region unlikely to regain 
its former market share.7 Much of the coal from the West is 
closer to the surface and cheaper to mine, but has relatively low 
energy content.8 It takes about fifty percent more Western coal 
to produce the same amount of electricity as Appalachian coal.9 
One of the benefits, however, of Western coal is that it is low in 
sulfur, a key pollutant targeted by Clean Air Act regulations.10 
Meanwhile, Columbia’s coal has high energy content and is low 
in sulfur and ash, making it ideal for power generation under 
U.S. regulations.11 Ground shipping between Wyoming and New 
England is expensive, particularly given that more coal is needed 
to provide the same energy output, while cheaper, high quality 
coal from Colombia can be shipped on barges to New England 
at lower total cost.12
Massachusetts has enacted clean air regulations for power 
plants that are stricter in some ways than the Clean Air Act 
regulations in place nationally.13 Power plants have the option 
of retrofitting, switching to renewable or other cleaner energy 
sources, or using cleaner inputs.14 Simply switching to lower 
sulfur coal that produces fewer emissions is less expensive 
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than either updating emissions controls or switching to a clean 
energy source.15 Power plants must submit compliance plans 
to the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 
(“DEP”), and most have chosen to comply through substitution 
of cleaner coals.16 In a more globalized coal market, the United 
States, and particularly Massachusetts, rely more heavily on coal 
imports to obtain the best quality coal at lower prices and to con-
tinue to avoid building power plants with better emissions reduc-
tion technology.
Colombian coal has a competitive advantage in part because 
shipping costs from Wyoming are so high and the Colombian 
coal industry is relatively new, allowing companies to mine the 
“easy” coal that has been mined out in Appalachia, but largely 
because regulation in Colombia is lax compared to that in the 
United States.17 In Columbia, workers have few rights and are 
paid substantially less, approximately one-seventh the pay of 
U.S. coal miners.18 The environmental impact of Colombian 
mines, particularly degraded water quality, ensures that the 
increased exports fail to improve the standard of living in coal 
communities.19 Colombia boasts the world’s largest open pit 
coal mine, the scale of which increases the environmental and 
social problems attendant with mining.20
If Massachusetts, or any other state, truly wants to lower 
emissions and improve the environment, regulations need to 
mandate genuinely clean energy sources and not merely trans-
fer the environmental costs across the globe or across sectors. 
Rather than allowing utilities to meet the requirements by 
switching to low-sulfur coal from South America, Massachusetts 
should take a longer view approach by investing in renewable 
energy sources. As long as coal continues to be used, regulations 
should ensure that power plants are equipped to burn it cleanly 
rather than sourcing low-sulfur coal from developing countries. 
While domestic coal reserves ensure that dependence on foreign 
coal will not carry the same risks and foreign policy implica-
tions as dependence on foreign oil, states should combine their 
environmental policies with local energy rather than searching 
farther afield to remain dependent on coal and resistant to a more 
meaningful shift in energy policy.
Endnotes: Global Trade on page 40
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InTroducTIon
In February 2011, activists marched across Nairobi, Kenya to the Chinese embassy waving banners and chanting “haki yetu!” (our right!).1 They demanded that the Chinese gov-
ernment end Chinese companies’ involvement in construction 
of the Gibe 3 dam, Ethiopia’s largest ever public infrastructure 
project.2 The activists had previously petitioned the Chinese 
government, Chinese companies, the Kenyan government, and 
Ethiopian government, but received no response.3 The march 
symbolized people’s frustration in being unable to communicate 
with the Chinese companies involved in the project.4
The Gibe 3 dam will span across the Omo River in Ethio-
pia, which flows into Lake Turkana on the southern border with 
Kenya.5 When completed in 2012, the dam will reduce the Omo 
River’s flow by thirty percent, affecting the 500,000 local people 
who depend on the lake and river for their livelihoods.6 The Lake 
Turkana region is already a landscape in crisis. According to 
several independent studies, the reduced water flow could lead 
to food insecurity, intensify pre-existing tribal conflicts in the 
area, and potentially destabilize the region near the Ethiopian, 
Kenyan, and Sudanese borders.7 The Gibe 3 dam is one of five 
large hydropower projects underway in Ethiopia.8 More dams 
are planned as the Ethiopian government has decided to export 
electricity to neighboring countries (although agreements have 
not yet been reached with these countries).9 When the dam’s res-
ervoir is filled, over 100,000 people will need to relocate to grow 
crops.10 Hundreds of thousands of others may lose their liveli-
hoods from herding, fishing, and trading.11
Many foreign investors declined to finance the project. In 
2008, JPMorgan Chase decided not to underwrite the project, 
and by 2010 the World Bank, African Development Bank, and 
European Investment Bank also withdrew funding consider-
ations.12 In July 2010, however, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (“ICBC,” the world’s largest bank) agreed to 
become the project’s largest lender, granting a loan of $500 mil-
lion to a Chinese company to provide equipment necessary to 
construct the dam.13
The Gibe 3 dam project is one example of how China’s 
overseas investments have gained international media attention 
in recent years. China’s decades-long growth has made it the sec-
ond largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan in mid-2010 
and soon to eclipse the United States.14 As China’s economy 
grows, so does its demand for natural resources and new mar-
kets.15 The Chinese government has shaped its foreign policy to 
keep up with demand for energy and resources by encouraging 
companies to “go global.”
From a macroeconomic perspective, the results have been 
impressive. Overseas investments have tapped natural resources 
ranging from minerals and oil in Africa, to hydropower in South-
east Asia.16 New markets have opened for Chinese goods and 
services.17 Many Chinese companies have found particularly 
lucrative opportunities in impoverished, resource-rich develop-
ing countries.18 In 2010, China became Africa’s largest trading 
partner.19 Yet at the same time, many people have expressed 
concern about the environmental and human rights footprint of 
these investments.20
This article provides a brief overview of efforts underway 
to strengthen environmental and social sustainability in China’s 
overseas investments. In recent years, the Chinese government 
and several companies have recognized the importance of ensur-
ing that investments are responsible, and have begun to adopt 
standards that govern overseas investments. The article first pro-
vides a brief overview of China’s approach to overseas invest-
ments, using examples from Africa. The article then describes 
how Western and multilateral financial institutions have tradi-
tionally played a role in promoting environmentally and socially 
responsible investments, and considers whether Chinese finan-
cial institutions could play a similar role. This article will also 
examine the environmental and social standards that are emerg-
ing for China’s overseas investments.
chIna’s aPProach To oVerseas InVesTmenTs
In 2001, China’s tenth Five-Year Plan21 directed Chinese 
companies to “go global,” as a way to gain access to natural 
resources, stimulate China’s exports, and build China’s markets 
abroad.22 The Chinese government, in turn, provided support 
to companies, including access to finance, tax exemptions, and 
insurance to lower the costs of doing business.23 As a result of 
the “go global” Strategy, China’s foreign direct investment flows 
increased from less than one billion dollars in 2000 to an esti-
mated fifty-five billion dollars in the first half of 2010 alone.24
As early as 1954, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai announced 
the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” that continue to 
set the parameters for China’s approach to international develop-
ment: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
(2) mutual non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other’s 
leaDing while catching up?:  
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internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful 
coexistence.25
Based on these principles, the Chinese government has 
branded Chinese overseas investment as a “new type” of stra-
tegic partnership for developing countries that differs from 
Western aid and investment.26 China’s overseas investments are 
closely linked to its development aid—both are important parts 
of the loan packages that the Chinese government often negoti-
ates with host governments. The Chinese government encour-
ages “win-win” development, guarantees non-interference in 
domestic affairs, and promises not to condition the receipt of 
aid on governance and democratic reforms.27 Often, Chinese aid 
comes in the form of infrastructure projects that are built by Chi-
nese companies.
natural reSource extraction in aFrica
Like many Western investments, a significant portion of 
China’s investments in Africa focus on natural resource extrac-
tion. Over fifty percent of all foreign direct investment inside 
Africa goes towards natural resource exploitation.28 Over one 
quarter of U.S. and Chinese imports come from major African 
oil exporting countries—Nigeria, Angola, and Algeria for the 
United States and Angola, Sudan, and Libya for China.29 Since 
2000, the number of oil companies operating in Africa (both 
private and state-owned) has increased from 250 to over 800.30 
Competition to exploit Africa’s natural resources is growing.31
Chinese oil companies remain relatively small players in 
Africa, providing only eight percent of the combined commer-
cial value of international oil companies’ investments in Africa.32 
Due to intense competition, Chinese companies have often 
invested in developing countries with weak governance systems, 
political instability, and high levels of corruption.33 Many com-
panies—both Western and Chinese—have come under criticism 
for their environmental and human rights records in Africa.34 In 
this sense, China’s interest in Africa’s natural resources is not 
unique but often receives media attention because of its high-
risk approach.
challengeS in protecting the environment anD 
human rightS
While Chinese companies are not unique in their interest 
in Africa’s natural resources, their approach often differs from 
Western counterparts. This poses distinct challenges in uphold-
ing environmental and human rights protections.
Chinese aid often takes the form of turn-key projects—
financed and built entirely by Chinese companies, and then 
turned over to the host government with technical assistance. 
These projects focus overwhelmingly (but not always) on con-
crete infrastructure projects such as roads and dams.35 After the 
civil war ended in Angola in 2002, for example, China was one 
of the first countries to provide development assistance.36 With 
Chinese support, Angola initiated over one hundred projects in 
energy, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries, 
and public works.37 Many of these projects involved construc-
tion of new infrastructure.
The relationship between China and Angola is complex, but 
several elements are revealing about the nature of China’s over-
seas investments:38
• The Chinese government worked directly with Angola’s 
president. In 2006, the president described the relation-
ship as “mutually advantageous,” “pragmatic,” and with 
“no political preconditions.”39 Cooperation is characterized 
by frequent bilateral visits of important state officials, and 
signing of various agreements. In these high-level negotia-
tions, there was little accountability to the public or efforts 
to respond to public concerns.40
• Bilateral trade increased rapidly in a few years time. Crude 
oil was the main Angola export to China, and imports from 
China also increased—including steel, cement, autos, and 
batteries.41 China was a major source of foreign direct 
investment, especially through the entry of Chinese con-
struction firms.42
• Although China received the most media attention, it was not 
the only actor. Angola also had investment agreements with 
India, Brazil, South Africa, and others that have increased in 
volume.43 Over time, other donors have expressed a willing-
ness to extend credit lines to Angola.44
• China’s loans to Angola were backed by oil revenue. In 2004, 
China Export Import Bank pledged a two billion dollar oil-
backed loan to Angola to fund reconstruction of infrastruc-
ture.45 For each project, the Chinese government proposed a 
few Chinese companies.46 Repayment began as soon as the 
project was completed.47 Revenue from oil was deposited in 
an escrow account, from which the amount for servicing the 
debt was deducted.48 The Government of Angola was then 
free to use the remainder at its own discretion.49 Loans were 
provided at a deeply concessional rate (LIBOR +1.5%).50
• Chinese laborers remained separate from the local popu-
lation. Chinese laborers typically stayed in Angola for one 
or two year contracts, often living in closed compounds 
near the construction site.51 There was little contact with 
Angolans.52 At the same time, a growing number of Chi-
nese entrepreneurs entered Angola.53 Communication chal-
lenges existed due to cultural differences and language 
barriers, and most businesses remained separate from local 
communities.54
• Corporate social responsibility was not part of the business 
plan. Chinese companies did not interact with local com-
munities or civil society organizations, and did not discuss 
environmental and human rights concerns openly.55 In gen-
eral, Chinese companies did not keep local communities 
informed of operations.56
usIng FInance To hoLd comPanIes  
accounTabLe For oVerseas ImPacTs
Civil society activists have long struggled to find ways to 
hold companies accountable for the environmental and human 
rights impacts of their overseas operations. Traditionally, the laws 
of the United States and other major investor countries do not 
apply overseas.57 One important approach, developed over the 
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past two decades by activists, has been to follow the money—to 
ensure that companies and governments only receive financing 
for projects that are environmentally and socially responsible.58
Many, but not all companies rely on financing to pursue 
large-scale overseas investments. When companies seek financ-
ing from investors, they often must prove that the investment 
is likely to generate a return. This includes identifying risks to 
the project’s success and demonstrating that these risks can be 
mitigated.59
Increasingly, companies acknowledge that environmental 
and human rights risks can harm the success of a development 
project (see Box 1).60 Harm to communities can lead to protests 
that block or delay construction, and can motivate governments 
to alter licenses, permits, and oversight of projects. Local and 
international civil society campaigns can also damage the repu-
tations of companies and financial institutions involved, affect-
ing share prices and the implementation of related projects.61
Box 1: Environmental and Social Risks62
When investing in developing countries, companies increas-
ingly consider the ways that harm to the environment and 
local communities can affect a project. The following are 
examples of risks that can arise out of environmental and 
human rights harms.
Financing risk – Financial institutions and investors may 
delay their financing, require more conditions, or decide not 
to participate.
Construction risk – The proponent may not be able to com-
plete the project on time or on budget.
Operational risk – The proponent may not be able to access 
necessary inputs, produce sufficient output, or sell at a suf-
ficient price, which can disrupt operations.
Reputational risk – The project may harm the proponent’s or 
financial institutions’ brand identity, which can translate into 
loss of market value.
Corporate risk – Delays or interruptions to a project may 
reduce the proponent’s profitability and asset values, decreas-
ing the proponent’s stock value, lowering its credit rating, and 
raising the cost of borrowing.
Host government risk – The host government may with-
draw permits and licenses, commence enforcement actions, 
impose civil or criminal penalties on the proponent, or tighten 
requirements.
Host country political risk – Political forces in the host 
country may threaten the project.
As a result, managing environmental and human rights risks 
is not just goodwill, but good business. Many studies show how 
safeguarding against these risks can help to manage the complex 
impacts of development projects.63 For example, engaging local 
communities in the design of a project can help build community 
support for the project and avoid conflict later in the project cycle.64
environmental anD Social StanDarDS oF Financial 
inStitutionS
In response to public criticism of its involvement in contro-
versial projects in the 1980s and 1990s—such as the Narmada 
Dam in India, which displaced over 300,000 people—the World 
Bank developed “safeguard” policies to help identify, avoid, and 
minimize harm to people and the environment.65 These policies 
require borrowing governments to follow risk mitigation proce-
dures in order to receive Bank financing.66 Examples of these 
procedures include conducting an environmental and social 
impact assessment, consulting with local communities, and 
restoring the livelihoods of displaced people.67
Since that time, other financial institutions have adopted 
similar policies.68 The International Finance Corporation 
(“IFC”)—the private sector financing arm of the World Bank 
Group—developed a detailed set of environmental and social 
standards in 2006.69 Over sixty private financial institutions have 
adopted the IFC’s standards through the Equator Principles.70 
These policies are constantly evolving. In 2011, for example, the 
IFC will adopt an updated version of its standards.71
Although these standards are far from perfect and have not 
always successfully prevented harmful investments from going 
forward,72 they have become an important pillar of environmen-
tal and human rights protections in overseas investments.
a roLe For chInese banks In  
susTaInabLe deVeLoPmenT?
Is there a role for Chinese banks to promote environmen-
tally and socially responsible overseas investments? In the past 
few years, both the Chinese government and several Chinese 
financial institutions have recognized the importance of envi-
ronmental and social standards.73 Efforts are now underway to 
develop these standards in the Chinese context.74
China’s financial sector has the potential to play an influen-
tial role in strengthening the environmental and social perfor-
mance of China’s overseas investments. Because many Chinese 
companies do not raise funds in the capital markets, the major-
ity of total capital available to Chinese industry comes from 
financial institutions.75 Over the past five years, in response to 
concern about the massive pollution that accompanies China’s 
rapid growth, the Chinese government has begun to apply “green 
credit” policies to domestic lending.76 Chinese officials have 
also worked closely with international financial institutions, par-
ticularly the IFC, to build capacity of Chinese financial institu-
tions to manage environmental and social risks.77 While still in 
their early years, China’s “green credit” policy has demonstrated 
measurable success.78
government inFluence over overSeaS inveStmentS
While the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese com-
panies to “go global,” these companies are not merely arms of the 
central government; many companies are encouraged to act auton-
omously.79 For example, many Chinese national oil companies, 
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are partially owned and controlled by the government,80 but have 
gained influence due to surging profits, listing on foreign stock 
exchanges, and relationships with international investors.81 Sig-
nificant profits from years of high oil prices have also enabled 
Chinese oil companies to finance their own investments, rather 
than relying solely on Chinese financial institutions.
Nevertheless, the government continues to provide financial 
support to these companies to help them compete against established 
international oil companies.82 In particular, Chinese banks play a 
prominent role in large acquisitions and investments and in negotia-
tions with host governments.83 As many Chinese companies interact 
at least to a certain extent with Chinese banks, their influence over 
environmental and social standards could continue to grow.
key bankS in china’S overSeaS inveStmentS
Although China’s largest private and state-owned banks 
often invest overseas, China’s state-owned “policy banks” are 
the leading financial actors behind the “go global” strategy.84 
The two primary banks that support overseas investments are 
the Export Import Bank of China (“China ExIm”) and the China 
Development Bank (“CDB”).85
Most major economies have “export credit agencies” 
that help to finance companies exporting goods and services 
abroad.86 China ExIm is one of the largest export credit agencies 
in the world.87 In 2009, ExIm and CBD combined approved over 
one hundred and ten billion dollars in lending.88 Founded as a 
policy bank, and now a semi-private bank, China Development 
Bank has also been one of the key funders of large infrastructure 
and industrial projects overseas.89
As Deborah Brautigam of American University describes:
The importance of policy banks like the ExIm Bank and 
China Development Bank in China’s development model 
and its international economic relations cannot be empha-
sized too strongly. China . . . is in many ways a typical East 
Asian developmental state. It acts to accelerate development 
through deliberate use of state policies. The central charac-
teristic of a developmental state is its control over finance. 
This control need not be exclusive – but it must be important 
at the margin in order to influence the behavior of firms in 
directions determined by political leaders. In this regard, Bei-
jing is following directly in the footsteps of the earlier Asian 
successes, Japan, Korean, and Taiwan, who all used develop-
ment finance to “pick winners” in the globalization race.90
In the next five years, we can expect these financial institu-
tions to play an increasingly important role in encouraging Chi-
nese companies towards environmentally and socially responsible 
investments. In March 2011, the National Peoples’ Congress met 
in Beijing to approve the next Five-Year Plan.91 At the core of this 
plan are environmental protection and social equity.92
emergIng sTandards In chIna’s  
oVerseas InVesTmenTs
Standards are already emerging that could influence China’s 
overseas investments. These include domestic policies, volun-
tary corporate standards, and policies designed specifically for 
overseas investments.
DomeStic policieS
For several years, Chinese financial institutions have pur-
sued “green credit” policies in their domestic lending.93 In 2003, 
China adopted a stronger environmental impact assessment law 
that ensures greater public participation in project decision-
making.94 In 2007, the State Environmental Protection Agency 
(now the Ministry of Environment), Peoples’ Bank of China, and 
Central Banking Regulatory Commission issued a green credit 
policy that requires all commercial banks to conduct environ-
mental screening of loans, and to restrict lending to companies 
with high energy consumption and pollution.95 The policy also 
established a credit blacklist that prohibits banks from lending 
to companies that fail to meet environmental standards. The 
Chinese government followed the Green Credit Policy with a 
Green Trade Policy (2007), Green Securities Policy (2008), and 
a Green Insurance Policy (2008).96 In 2008, the government took 
measures to increase public access to environmental information 
from the government and companies.97 These experiences may 
help to inform future standards for China’s overseas investments.
voluntary corporate StanDarDS
In 2008, President Hu Jintao announced that companies 
should establish the concept of global responsibility, 
include social responsibility in their business strategy 
on their own, abide by the laws in the country where 
the enterprises operate and international common busi-
ness practices, improve their management models, and 
pursue unity of economic returns and social results.98
Encouraged by the government, some Chinese banks and 
companies are taking an interest in corporate social responsibil-
ity.99 This becomes particularly relevant as Chinese banks and 
companies increasingly interact on a global scale, enter foreign 
stock exchanges, and market their products abroad.
In 2007, China Construction Bank was the first state-
owned Chinese bank to publish a corporate social responsibil-
ity report.100 In the following year, China Development Bank, 
ICBC, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of China also 
released their first reports.101 In 2008, Industrial Bank became 
the first private Chinese bank to adopt the Equator Principles,102 
a global standard for environmentally and socially responsible 
project finance. Although many banks’ voluntary corporate stan-
dards focus on their domestic lending activities, this may soon 
expand to overseas lending.
overSeaS lenDing
Traditionally, Chinese banks and companies have addressed 
environmental and social risks only by complying with host coun-
tries’ laws and regulations. As companies expand their operations 
in countries with weak governance and regulatory capacity, and as 
other multilateral institutions improve their own standards, Chi-
nese companies appear to be moving in a similar direction.
Slowly but steadily, environmental and social standards 
are emerging for financial institutions’ overseas lending (see 
Emerging Standards for Chinese overseas investment Box 2). All 
financial institutions now apply the government’s Green Credit 
Policy to domestic lending. In 2004, China Export Import Bank 
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developed a short set of environmental guidelines for its over-
seas lending, and publicly disclosed revised, more robust guide-
lines in 2008.103 These guidelines require clients to conduct an 
environmental and social impact assessment.104 China ExIm 
monitors the client’s implementation of the assessment.105
In 2009, the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s think 
tank, the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, along 
with the non-governmental Global Environmental Institute and 
the University of International Business and Economics, com-
pleted draft environmental guidelines for Chinese companies 
involved in aid and overseas investment.106 Several Chinese 
ministries and regulatory bodies are negotiating the guidelines 
and may approve them in the coming months.107 The guidelines 
would require companies operating overseas to conduct envi-
ronmental impact assessments, develop mitigation measures, 
compensate people for environmental damage, and adhere to 
international treaties signed by China and host countries.108 Chi-
nese companies would be required to follow Chinese environ-
mental standards if they were higher than host countries.109
Box 2: Emerging Standards for Chinese Overseas Investment
Date Description of standards
2004 China Exim Environment Policy110
Three-paragraph policy developed in 2004 but pub-
licly released only in April 2007.
2006 State Council’s Nine Principles on Overseas 
Investment111
Developed to “encourage and standardize” compa-
nies’ overseas investment. Requires Chinese com-
panies to comply with local laws, design contract 
bidding to be transparent, protect labor rights of local 
employees, protect the environment, and implement 
corporate responsibilities.
2007 China Export Import Bank’s Environmental 
Guidelines112
Publicly released in 2008. Governs investments 
overseas. Requires companies to conduct an environ-
mental impact assessment and to compensate com-
munities for environmental damage.
2007 Guide on Sustainable Overseas Silviculture by 
Chinese Enterprises113
Governs the overseas practices of Chinese logging 
companies. Requires preservation of high value for-
ests and endangered species, monitoring systems, 
and consultations with local communities.
2008 SASAC statement on overseas state-owned companies114
The Director of State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (which governs state-
owned companies) stated that Chinese companies 
going abroad must comply with international rules 
and local laws.
2008 State Council regulations on international 
contracts115
A State Council regulation allows the government to 
fine companies up to RMB one million for undertak-
ing contracts without official approval. This regula-
tion improves government supervision, protects the 
rights of Chinese workers, and enhances compliance 
with host country laws.
2008 National Audit Office’s new department on over-
seas assets116
The office announced a new department focusing on 
state-owned or central-capital controlled companies 
and overseas national assets. The department will 
seek to uncover any potential misuse of funds, with 
special attention to overseas state owned assets.
2009 Draft environmental guidelines for overseas 
investment117
The Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, 
in cooperation with the Global Environmental Insti-
tute and the University of International Business and 
Economics, completed draft guidelines. The Ministry 
of Environmental Protection and China Banking 
Regulatory Commission are negotiating the final 
guidelines.
concLusIon
As Chinese banks and companies continue to expand their 
overseas footprint, they will undertake more projects in envi-
ronmentally and socially sensitive areas. The Chinese govern-
ment’s current efforts to develop standards are an important first 
step, but other changes will need to follow. As Western financial 
institutions have experienced, policies on paper are meaningless 
unless they change the behavior of companies abroad.
Numerous challenges remain. The implementation of any 
guidelines will need buy-in and coordination across the numer-
ous Chinese agencies involved in overseas investment. Financial 
institutions will also begin to explore ways to enforce and hold 
companies accountable for their environmental and social per-
formance. Chinese companies have little experience in engaging 
directly with local communities and civil society organizations, 
even though direct engagement is the pillar of environmental 
and human rights risk management.
Chinese banks and companies can learn from foreign com-
panies by engaging in dialogue and trading experiences, but this 
will not be enough. Ultimately, a uniquely Chinese approach 
will need to develop to environmental and social risk man-
agement that is appropriate for Chinese culture, but also fully 
respects the environment and human rights of local communi-
ties. In this way, the Chinese development model can truly help 
to bring “mutual benefit” and “win-win” development to other 
developing countries.
Endnotes: Leading While Catching up? on page 41
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As alternative energy sources gain prevalence in energy markets worldwide,1 small wind turbines have emerged as a viable alternative to their larger and more expen-
sive counterparts. While most attention has been drawn to their 
domestic application in developed countries, and various low 
cost commercial turbines are available to consumers for several 
thousand dollars, they also offer great promise in electrification 
of developing countries.2 However, because of the technologi-
cal nature of small wind turbines, as well as the socio-political 
characteristics of the regions in which their use is most appli-
cable, special care must be taken 
while developing policies to 
encourage investment as well as 
during implementation of con-
struction plans. If these factors 
are carefully considered, small 
wind turbines may prove to be 
an environmentally conscious 
option for the electrification of 
developing countries.
Small wind turbines dif-
fer from large turbines in many 
important ways, demonstrating 
their greater versatility. While 
large turbines require mature 
power grids, small turbines 
have application both on and off 
existing power grids, as a result 
of their size and low energy out-
put.3 Their off grid application avoids the heavy cost of expand-
ing transmission lines to rural regions of developing countries.4 
Additionally, small turbines operate on lower wind speeds than 
large turbines, giving them more placement options.5 Experts 
also indicate that small turbines, if placed correctly in suitable 
locations, generate more energy per dollar than other common 
alternative energy sources such as photovoltaics.6
There are three overlapping phases in which introduction 
of small wind turbines must be carefully considered: invest-
ment, planning, and implementation. To encourage investment, 
successful policy initiatives in developed countries may offer 
effective models for developing countries. In developed coun-
tries, investment in small wind turbines usually originates at 
the individual household level.7 Here, feed in tariffs (“FITs”), 
which compensate individuals per kilowatt-hour of electricity 
generated,8 offer an effective method to encourage investment.9 
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While there are numerous FIT models,10 those of Germany and 
Spain, where individuals may be compensated at rates as much 
as four times the rate paid to commercial power sources, have 
been highly successful in encouraging installation of small-scale 
renewable energy systems.11 With success and popularity, how-
ever, also comes an element of risk. Developing countries must 
be mindful that if too many individuals opt into FIT programs, 
operating costs could rise sharply as governmental compensation 
obligations grow.12 Notwithstanding this risk, FIT programs are 
the most promising way to encourage investment in alternative 
energy sources in developing 
countries. Any nation seriously 
considering widespread imple-
mentation of a renewable energy 
scheme should also consider 
exemption of import tariffs on 
equipment.13 Such an exemption 
will lower startup costs and fur-
ther encourage investment.
Rural regions of developing 
countries, without established 
power grids, face additional 
investment considerations. As 
absence of electricity often indi-
cates lower levels of affluence, 
capital will be less available 
than in regions with established 
power grids.14 While FITs may 
provide some encouragement 
for investment, the availability of credit in these regions will be 
crucial for the viability of any small wind project.15 Sources of 
credit include international financial institutions and countries’ 
development agencies, such as that of France (L’Agence Fran-
çaise de Développement), which extends environmental credit 
lines to local banks in developing African countries.16 NGO sub-
sidies are also a source of credit; however, their funding must be 
carefully designed to create conditions under which they will no 
longer be needed in order to ensure ultimate market sustainabil-
ity for renewable energy.17
To break even, small wind projects require approximately 
ten to twenty years before the initial cost can be recovered.18 If 
connection to an outside established grid is likely, and in-place 
While FITs may provide 
some encouragement 
for investment, the 
availability of credit in 
these regions will be 
crucial for the viability of 
any small wind project
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FIT payments are not high enough, then a project’s economic 
feasibility could potentially be undermined by a sudden influx of 
cheaper electricity. Under this scenario, individual, community, 
and institutional investors would never recover their construction 
and maintenance costs, as the market rate for electricity would 
now be too low.19 For this reason, it is imperative that investment 
in small wind turbines be incentivized in regions of developing 
countries where connection to an established grid is not expected 
during the ten to twenty year cost-recovery period.
Once a developing country has created investment incentives, 
planning and implementation are the next steps for successful 
introduction of small wind turbines. According to the Center of 
Excellence for Renewable Energy, there are six critical factors at 
this stage of development: management, local training capacity, 
technical support, viability of the energy source, ownership, and 
political interference.20 Dealing with these issues firsthand, Practi-
cal Action, an international charity based out of the UK whose goal 
is to combat poverty through the use of technology, has introduced 
small wind turbines to isolated villages in Sri Lanka and Peru.21 
Before choosing project locations, Practical Action assessed the 
demand for electricity, paying close attention to use patterns.22 
Ultimately, the distinguishing factor that made wind power in 
Sri Lanka more feasible than Peru was the existing demand for 
electricity.23 However, to forecast energy demand purely based on 
current energy demand would be shortsighted; potential demand 
should be comparably weighted.24 In making such determinations, 
relevant factors include population size, level of infrastructure, 
and number of viable financial institutions.25
Investment in human capital is the final and perhaps most 
critical aspect in implementing any small wind project.26 The 
construction, operation, and maintenance of small wind tur-
bines require a high degree of technical understanding.27 For 
implementation to be successful, the local population must have 
proper training and knowledge.28 Community involvement is 
pivotal, as without a sense of ownership, local populations will 
have no sense of commitment to their small wind turbines and 
these turbines could easily fall into disrepair.29
Community involvement, in addition to investment incen-
tives, comprehensive planning, and adequate technical training, 
is just one critical factor that determines the ultimate success of 
any small wind turbine project. If these factors are carefully con-
sidered, small wind turbines offer promise towards electrifica-
tion of developing nations in a way that is both environmentally 
conscious and sustainable.
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InTroducTIon
The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) as amended by the Uruguay Round Amendments, which created the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), contains 
rules on Border Tax Adjustments (“BTAs”).1 No single section 
of this agreement deals exclusively with BTAs; however, rules 
addressing BTAs can be found throughout, namely in Articles 
II, III, and XVI.2
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”) Working Party, BTAs are “any 
fiscal measures that put into effect the destination principle in 
whole or in part.”3 In other words, BTAs relieve exported prod-
ucts of some or all of the tax the exporting country charged on 
similar domestic products in the home market and enables the 
importing country to charge some or all of the tax on imported 
products that it charges on similar domestic products. The term 
“border tax adjustment” is somewhat confusing because it sug-
gests that a fiscal measure is applied at the border, which is not 
always the case.4 Although in many cases imports are taxed on 
entry, certain countries apply a tax to imports after the goods 
have crossed the border and have been sold to other merchants or 
consumers. Moreover, the OCED has noted that certain tax sys-
tems do not tax exports at all and make no adjustment at the bor-
der.5 Considering these varying tax systems, the OECD Working 
Party has recommended the replacement of the term “border tax 
adjustments” with “tax adjustments applied to goods entering 
into international trade.”6
The OECD’s careful treatment of BTAs illustrates that they 
are not a novel concept to international trade. However, BTAs 
have only recently been considered as an innovative policy 
option for addressing the challenges of climate change. The con-
cept of climate change BTAs is as follows: carbon-taxing coun-
tries would levy import fees on goods that non-carbon-taxing 
countries manufacture. The motivating factor for these measures 
is—at least in theory—to internalize the real costs of producing 
goods and services with respect to international climate change 
regulation, thereby leveling the playing field between producers 
of like products from different countries.7
A BTA would tax imported goods the equivalent of what the 
producers would have had to pay to produce them in the home 
market they are entering. Under this system, domestic produc-
ers in countries with carbon taxes will not face costly climate 
change measures that foreign producers do not face in their 
home countries. An alternative approach would be to impose 
taxes on imported goods that are equivalent to the enforcement 
of emissions allowance trading.8 Therefore, in order to import 
products from a nation that does not comply with the carbon 
taxes applied in the importing country, an importer of goods 
would be required to purchase emission rights in his home coun-
try, compensating for the difference.9
Some commentators have mentioned that these measures 
should be called Border Carbon Adjustment (“BCA”), because 
“requirements to buy into domestic cap-and-trade schemes are 
more like regulations than taxes.”10 However, while recognizing 
BCA as a more precise concept, considering BTAs have usually 
been proposed to address climate change in the form of taxes, we 
will continue using the term BTA. This article will first provide a 
background on climate change and multilateral efforts to resolve 
the problem. It will then move on to a discussion of the potential 
treatment of BTAs under WTO law. Finally, we will discuss the 
implications of this analysis in Latin America with a focus on 
Chile.
cLImaTe change background  
and muLTILaTeraL eFForTs
Climate change is a widely recognized, global problem 
caused by humans, and the time for action is now; current trends 
indicate that we will likely arrive at a point of no return between 
2015 and 2020.11 Commentators note that the cost of taking 
measures now is much less expensive than waiting until 2020 or 
2030.12 Climate change is regulated by a multilateral treaty and 
protocol in the context of the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).13 Even if measures 
to address climate change are both multilateral and domestic, the 
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perspective from Latin America, and especially from Chile, is 
that environmental issues and global problems should be treated 
multilaterally.14
The official position of the Government of Chile’s foreign 
policy, unchanged in recent decades, is “to contribute to the 
strengthening of multilateralism.”15 In this sense, Chile aims to 
strengthen the climate regime in the United Nations. The Chilean 
government officially promotes the joint action of nations on the 
global agenda in areas such as security threats, natural resources, 
energy, environment, sustainable development, climate change, 
international violations, poverty, and governance.16
In the context of multilateral solutions, Border Tax Adjust-
ments seem to be a unilateral answer to the problem of climate 
change. BTAs can be politically feasible for the adoption of 
national regulations in countries like the United States, but they 
are seen as a threat to the international trading system and could 
potentially violate international trade law under the WTO.
Resolving this potential conflict between climate change 
mitigation measures and international trade law is of paramount 
importance. Since the early nineties, multilateral environmental 
agreements, soft law instruments, and the OECD have encour-
aged the use of a broad range of instruments, and especially 
the use of market-based instruments, to reduce environmental 
impacts.17 States are increasingly employing economic instru-
ments, such as taxes and charges, as instruments of environmen-
tal policy-making to address inputs and production processes.18
Even though no Border Tax Adjustments have been imple-
mented yet, the United States and the European Union have 
considered the possibility of imposing BTAs ever since the Cli-
mate Conference held in Copenhagen on December 2009 failed 
to produce a global deal to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions.19
european union
BTAs have been a subject of debate in the European Union 
since 2006 when the EU’s High Level Group (“HLG”) on Com-
petitiveness, Energy, and Environment advised the European 
Commission to analyze the viability of all potential policy mea-
sures, including border tax adjustments, that could encourage 
EU trading partners to decrease GHG emissions, so as to reduce 
climate change risks and the impact of a carbon premium on 
European competitiveness.20 However, consensus to implement 
BTAs has not been reached and European heads of state remain 
divided on the subject. In December 2006, EU Trade Commis-
sioner Peter Mandelson pointed out that:
[A] specific “climate” tariff on countries that have 
not ratified Kyoto . . . would be highly problematic 
under current [WTO] rules, and almost impossible to 
implement in practice. [D]eveloping countries are not 
required to make specific emissions cuts under the 
Kyoto Protocol; also . . . some U.S. states have ambi-
tious climate policies. 21
John Hontelez, Secretary General of the European Environ-
mental Bureau22 affirmed that:
[BTAs] might be the answer which allows the EU to 
develop responsible climate policies without having 
to wait for other countries. They would result in prod-
ucts imported from the US being taxed to compensate 
for resulting differences in production costs. Thus EU 
firms would be protected against unfair, carbon-care-
less competition from outside.23
In 2006, then French Prime Minister Dominique de Ville-
pin suggested that countries that do not join a post-2012 interna-
tional treaty on climate change should face extra tariffs on their 
industrial exports.24 De Villepin argued that “[c]ountries like the 
U.S. and China . . . should not be allowed to benefit from efforts 
to reduce climate change without having to shoulder some of the 
costs or suffer from any related loss in competitiveness.”25 Sub-
sequent reports of the HLG do not reach the subject of Border 
Tax Adjustments and instead called for other measures as inter-
national action on climate change.26
uniteD StateS
The relationship between the U.S. and the international cli-
mate change regime has been controversial. As the Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution of 1997 asserts, the United States should not sign or 
agree to any convention or protocol on any subject matter con-
taining new commitments to limit or reduce GHGs unless it also 
mandates developing countries to do the same, or that “would 
result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.”27 
It has been reported that some sectors of U.S. “industry have 
lobbied hard for climate legislation to include border measures, 
citing competitiveness concerns, the need to encourage large 
developing country emitters to adopt binding emissions targets, 
and fears of ‘carbon leakage’”—the relocation of firms to coun-
tries with fewer carbon restrictions, increasing global emissions 
or leaving them unaffected.28
In this context, in June 2008 the Lieberman-Warner Cli-
mate Security Act29 was introduced in the U.S. Congress with 
the intention of establishing measures to reduce GHGs, includ-
ing a cap-and-trade program and a measure requiring certain 
importers to submit special allowances.30 Rather than impose a 
Border Tax Adjustment, this bill would have required importers 
of GHG-intensive products from other countries without com-
parable GHG reduction schemes to buy international credits or 
other emission certificates from the federal government or from 
a U.S. regulatory program.31
The same year, another bill, The Climate Market Auction 
Trust and Trade Emissions Reduction System Act of 2008 (“Cli-
mate Matters Act of 2008”), included measures to reduce GHGs 
emissions, including offering developing WTO participant coun-
tries “access to the carbon market . . . includ[ing] additional 
incentives such as the ability to choose the base year or maxi-
mum level of allowable greenhouse gas emissions for its emis-
sions trading system, rather than requiring it to match the [U.S.] 
system.”32 This measure targeted the large emerging economies 
and gave exceptions to: “least developed countries” and “coun-
tries that generate less than [five percent] of global emissions.”33 
Moreover, the income of the BTA “would be used to offset the 
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negative effects of climate change in developing countries (e.g., 
through technology transfer).”34
On June 26, 2009, the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009 (“ACES”) was approved by the House of Represen-
tatives by a narrow 219-212 margin.35 Although the bill never 
passed the Senate, it aimed to reduce emissions with a gradu-
ated schedule through 2050 by calling for extra import charges 
on goods from countries that do not cap greenhouse gas emis-
sions.36 President Barack Obama considers ACES’s border tax 
adjustments clauses to be tariffs penalizing goods from coun-
tries that are not actively limiting GHG emissions, and criticism 
has arisen due to concerns of protectionism and because the bill 
appears to make tariff penalties the rule.37 Obama recognized 
a legitimate concern that American businesses not be disadvan-
taged by higher energy costs, but emphasized that various forms 
of transitional assistance for energy-intensive industries already 
existed without the need for “a tariff approach.”38
All U.S. legislative proposals have two common features: 
they exempt goods from border tax adjustments if imported 
from countries with minimum GHG emissions, and apply BTAs 
to “primary products” with high GHG emission levels during 
their production process, such as: iron, steel, aluminum, cement, 
glass, paper and pulp, chemicals, and industrial ceramics.39 
ACES also covers any “manufactured item for consumption” 
that generates “a substantial quantity of greenhouse gas emis-
sions.”40 These policies specifically target developing countries 
like China, Brazil, and India that are considered large emitters 
of GHGs because most developed countries already have emis-
sions reduction plans and exports from smaller countries would 
be excluded by the legislation as they emit less than 0.5% of 
global emissions.41 Nevertheless, because of their drafting, these 
measures could easily affect other developing countries if they 
increase their GHG emissions, even if overall they contribute 
minimally in the context of global emissions, as we will explain 
later.
border Tax adjusTmenTs and The WTo
As we will see, economists and lawyers in the field of both 
international trade and environmental law have discussed the 
legality of BTA measures under WTO law. However, up to now 
neither BTAs nor climate change policies have been challenged 
under the WTO dispute settlement system. Commentators have 
opined that a case regarding a BTA before the WTO would be 
difficult and controversial for lack of precedent at the WTO and 
before the international climate regime.42 Indeed, even the Kyoto 
Protocol provides in Article 2.3 that parties included in Annex I 
“shall strive to implement policies and measures under this Arti-
cle in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the 
adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade, 
and social, environmental, and economic impacts on other Par-
ties, especially developing country Parties.”43
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol list various poli-
cies and measures by which industrialized countries can achieve 
emission limitations, including tax and duty exemptions and 
subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors.44 Nevertheless, 
the protocol lacks specificity because it does not offer concrete 
steps or targets to achieve those policies and measures. Due to 
this lack of specificity, it is difficult to claim jurisdiction over 
such behavior and to authorize a body or mechanism to address 
it. As a consequence, policies and measures are not included in 
the UN climate regime’s compliance system and dispute settle-
ment procedure.45
It is not clear that the Kyoto Protocol’s permissive rules 
on policies and measures are in conflict with WTO law, either 
directly or indirectly, and some commentators believe that 
properly designed BTAs could meet WTO rules, yet others dis-
agree.46 Discussions revolve around the legality of BTAs under 
the international trade system, the relation between BTAs and 
subsidies, the difficulty of assessing or calculating BTAs, and 
the justification of such measures under climate change regime.
bTas are PermIssIbLe under WTo LaW
BTAs are explicitly allowed by the GATT as long as the 
tax imposed on imported goods is no greater than the tax estab-
lished for similar domestic products.47 It has been noted that 
“the GATT does not impose any requirement that nations adopt 
a tax base that can be administered without double taxation, in 
fact or in principle. For example, countries can impose a BTA on 
imports without any corresponding rebate for exports.”48
However, it is still uncertain whether BTAs can be used 
for taxable inputs that are not physically incorporated 
into the final traded product. For instance, it is not clear 
if an import tax could vary based on the amount of car-
bon dioxide emitted during a good’s production—WTO 
rules would have to be interpreted in a way that consid-
ers products not to be “like” each other based on their 
carbon footprints.49
The latter would be true only if this factor could be consid-
ered a “relevant comparator.”50 To do so would require advanc-
ing the argument that any product which emits one ton of carbon 
is a “like product” akin to any other product which emits one ton 
of carbon. 51
Some commentators assert that BTAs “raise the costs of 
imported products based on the amount of greenhouse gases 
emitted occurring abroad during the manufacturing of each prod-
uct. In international trade, this type of regulation is a process and 
production method (“PPM”) measure and cannot be used to dis-
tinguish between like products.”52 Therefore, the argument goes, 
“BTAs on environmental taxes embodied in pollution-intensive 
traded goods are or should be barred when the tax is on emis-
sions or a polluting input rather than the good itself.”53
The non-adopted report of the GATT Tuna-Dolphin Panel 
was the origin of the process/product distinction:
under the national treatment principle of Article III, 
contracting parties may apply border tax adjustments 
with regard to those taxes that are borne by products, 
but not for domestic taxes not directly levied on prod-
ucts (such as income taxes). . . . The Panel considered 
that it would be inconsistent to limit the application 
of this Note to taxes that are born by products while 
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permitting its application to regulations not applied to 
the product as such.54
However, like the Tuna-Dolphin decision itself, neither the 
GATT contracting parties nor the WTO have ever adopted the 
process/product approach. Several scholars “have observed that 
the process/product distinction itself was rooted in a misunder-
standing by the panel of the GATT rules governing BTAs.”55 
Moreover, from a historical point of view, “it was the intent of 
the original GATT negotiators that process as well as product 
charges be border adjustable.”56
In addition, further GATT and WTO Dispute Settlement 
decisions have moved away from the process/product approach 
and have since considered other methods for determining what 
“like product” is. Some of those consider the motivation for a 
government’s product categorization in determining its legiti-
macy, including the Japan Alcohol Panel Report (1987),57 the 
U.S. Alcohol case,58 and the U.S. Taxes on Automobiles Report.59 
This approach is potentially much more sensitive to environmen-
tal policy goals like climate change. We must also keep in mind 
that according to Article III, Section V of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), 
“measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral 
ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”60
Even if a BTA were permitted and properly assessed, it 
would still need to overcome other legal trade hurdles. Once 
found to be covered by GATT Article III, the BTA must also 
meet the substantive test in that provision, which requires that 
imported products not be treated less favorably than like domes-
tic products (“national treatment”).61 In addition, the BTA must 
avoid discrimination between imports from different countries, 
as required by the “most-favored nation” obligation of GATT 
Article I.62 For some authors, a unilaterally imposed BTA 
on imported goods would most likely go against WTO rules, 
whereas using national treatment and most-favored nation prin-
ciples63 prevents different treatment of foreign products vis-à-
vis domestic like products.64
Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to what would happen 
with a cap-and-trade system and whether “the obligation to hold 
emission credits or allowances up to one’s actual level of carbon 
emissions be qualified as an ‘internal tax or other internal charge 
of any kind’ which, under GATT Article III:2, can be imposed 
also on imports.”65
noT ImPosIng bTas Is equIVaLenT To a subsIdy
One of the most famous scholars to advocate BTAs is 
Joseph Stiglitz who affirmed that “[n]ot paying the cost of dam-
age to the environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full 
costs of workers would be.”66 According to Stiglitz, “in most of 
the developed countries of the world today, corporations are pay-
ing the cost of polluting the global environment, in the form of 
taxes imposed on coal, oil, and gas.”67 However, American firms 
are being massively subsidized because of the relative lack of 
this taxation in the U.S. He proposes a remedy:
[O]ther countries should prohibit the importation of 
American goods produced using energy intensive 
technologies, or, at the very least, impose a high tax 
on them, to offset the subsidy that those goods cur-
rently are receiving . . . [T]he United States itself has 
recognized this principle. It prohibited the importation 
of Thai shrimp that caused unnecessary deaths of large 
numbers of endangered species . . . [and] the WTO sus-
tained the important principle that global environmen-
tal concerns trump narrow commercial interests . . . . 
[I]f one can justify restricting importation of shrimp . 
. . to protect turtles, certainly one can justify restrict-
ing importation of goods produced by technologies that 
unnecessarily pollute our atmosphere.68
The EU also considers not applying BTAs as a potential ille-
gal subsidy that causes two major problems:
The first is the competitiveness of energy-intensive 
industries in the EU vis-à-vis competing industries in 
jurisdictions without similar environmental restric-
tions. Normally, a foreign producer that operates at 
lower costs is simply more competitive and should . . 
. be able to out-compete its domestic rival. But when 
lower costs result from the lack of environmental costs, 
the advantage is artificial . . . . The second potential 
problem is “carbon leakage,” which means that any 
domestic carbon reduction would be offset in the global 
environmental commons by an increase in carbon emis-
sions elsewhere.69
But what happens if we apply this solution to developing 
countries? Should we not consider the principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility? This principle is one of the cor-
nerstones of sustainable development, emerging in the context 
of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and underpinning the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol.70 However for developing countries,71 
Stiglitz suggests something different: a common (global) envi-
ronmental tax on emissions that addresses their social cost.72
But, should we consider the absence of emission cuts a sub-
sidy or a carbon tax? It is clearly not a subsidy in a traditional 
sense, but as some commentators have pointed out:
The problem is not that the Chinese government is 
paying Chinese producers or is otherwise transferring 
funds; rather, the problem is that the government fails 
to act, that is, it fails to impose and collect a carbon tax 
or to otherwise force Chinese producers to internalize 
the full cost of carbon emitted in China.73
Thus, even if not imposing a carbon tax or not requiring 
producers to internalize the cost of carbon could be qualified as 
a “subsidy” under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures, countervailing duties to offset subsidies by 
foreign governments can only be levied in the case of a particu-
lar subsidy74 to “an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises 
or industries.”75
A further question arises if “carbon credits” would be con-
sidered a subsidy if they are distributed for free. What would 
happen if, using the cap-and-trade system, domestic producers 
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who face competition from competitors who manufacture in 
countries without GHG laws were given free credits? This pro-
posal would most likely provide a subsidy to the industry in 
comparison to other domestic industries and could potentially 
violate trade law, but this conclusion is arguable.
bTas are dIFFIcuLT To assess or caLcuLaTe
We have seen that BTAs could be used to “level the playing 
field between taxed domestic manufacturers and untaxed foreign 
competitors.”76 Under GATT Articles II and III, WTO members 
may impose “internal charges” on imported goods.77 Neverthe-
less, while internal charges can be relatively easy to identify, “it 
is difficult to assess the quantity of carbon emissions resulting 
from the production of a particular good. Could carbon taxes or 
higher energy costs linked to a cap-and-trade system qualify for 
a similar adjustment?”78
Another key question is whether it is even possible to estab-
lish a trade appropriate BTA. A true BTA would tax the actual 
GHG emissions resulting from manufacture, which seems nearly 
impossible to quantify. Moreover, it is not yet clear whether a 
BTA could be administered in a way that is truly free trade neu-
tral, or if due to its administrative difficulty it would inevitably 
be a trade barrier.
Proposed BTAs are generally based on the average addi-
tional cost of the GHG law and raise the following pertinent 
question under WTO law: if a general tax on carbon emissions 
is imposed based on the local corporation’s actual carbon emis-
sions (so a low emissions factory pays less), and an international 
company with the same low emissions pays the industry average, 
would this be legal under WTO rules?
bTas can be jusTIFIed To PreVenT cLImaTe change
Even if BTAs conflict with international trade law, they 
might still be legal if justifiable under GATT Article XX,79 
which specifies the conditions under which State Members can 
be exempted from WTO general rules. Two of these enumerated 
exemptions could be relevant in the case of BTAs: if doing so is 
necessary “to protect human, animal, or plant life or health,”80 or 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”81 
In addition, we must keep in mind that the introductory para-
graph (“Chapeau”) of Article XX allows such measures as long 
as they “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade.”82 Such an exemption would most likely 
“center on whether, under the introductory phrase of GATT 
Article XX, a [BTA] . . . is applied on a variable scale that takes 
account of local conditions in foreign countries, including their 
own efforts to fight global warming and the level of economic 
development in developing countries.”83 Therefore, a govern-
ment “would also have to show that the measure is being applied 
squarely to avoid ‘leakage,’ rather than to offset competitive con-
cerns.”84 Additionally, to qualify as an exception under Article 
XX, the BTA would also have to be the least trade restrictive 
measure.85
A recent article also claims that BTAs “will only survive 
a WTO challenge if they successfully invoke one of the GATT 
Article XX environmental exceptions,” which would be difficult 
because BTAs are designed with the principle intent of main-
taining economic competitiveness.86 In contrast, if a BTA based 
on a domestic carbon tax neither discriminates against imports 
as compared to domestic products nor as compared to other 
imported goods, it might be permissible without resorting to the 
exemptions embodied in GATT Article XX.87
border Tax adjusTmenTs and deVeLoPIng 
counTrIes: LaTIn amerIca’s case
Some “targeted” countries of future BTAs have expressed 
their opposition to these measures, most notably China88 and 
India.89 However, for the most part, Latin America has not pre-
sented either support or opposition for BTAs. In analyzing why 
this may be the case, it is first important to examine the contribu-
tion of Latin American countries to global GHG production and 
the exports from Latin America on which BTAs could be applied 
in the future. Chile is presented as a case study.
In 2004, Chilean emissions were only 0.2% of total global 
emissions.90 However, while the annual per capita emission level 
of 3.9 tons of CO2 per inhabitant is very modest compared to 
developed nations, Chile is second in total GHG emissions in 
South America only to Venezuela,91 and has emissions similar 
to Portugal when it undertook its Kyoto reduction obligations.92
Furthermore, the economy of Chile is becoming more and 
more dependent on coal. University of Chile studies show that 
by 2030 electric generation in Chile will be sixty percent depen-
dent on coal. That means that CO2 emissions may grow from 
14.2 to 85 million tons of CO2 between 2006 and 2030 and that 
emission per capita may grow from 3.6 tons of CO2 in 2005 to 
13.8 tons by 2030, more than China and OECD countries.93 On 
March 1, 2011, the Central Castilla coal-fired power plant of the 
Atacama region,94 the largest coal-fired power plant in South 
America, was approved by the Chilean impact assessment sys-
tem (“SEIA”). The day after, SEIA approved a project aimed at 
extracting coal to be sold to coal-power plants. These develop-
ments have generated public concern and controversy.95
Directly related to BTAs is the question of the carbon foot-
print of exported products. This was conceptualized as a way to 
internalize climate costs generated by the production and trans-
portation of products. Studies have shown that Kyoto Protocol 
Annex I countries are net importers of carbon and that develop-
ing countries are carbon exporters.96
Chile has begun to measure the carbon footprint of its main 
products, particularly exported ones. But in the end, the ques-
tion is how deep the carbon footprint of each of those products 
and sectors is, and ultimately: are the countries, which receive 
Chilean exports, going to adopt a BTA that affects Chilean 
products? Copper mining, which accounts for the largest por-
tion of exports, is energy intensive. Chile has become an OECD 
member,97 and the OECD recommended that Chile increase its 
application of the polluter pays principle (“PPP”) in the Chil-
ean economy.98 The WTO recommends implementing this PPP 
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through measures such as a carbon tax and tradable permits. 
International trade rules require Chile to assume the cost of 
the “carbonization” of its economy or to accept the cost of lost 
competitiveness.99
concLusIon
At first glance, BTAs appear to have the potential to reduce 
global GHG emissions, but there are some important caveats to 
consider: a) BTAs are unilateral in a world of multilateral climate 
change regimes;100 b) BTAs could be used against developing 
countries, reversing the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility; c) the permissibility of BTAs under the GATT 
depends on the legal interpretation of the relevant international 
treaties, colored by political and administrative concerns; d) 
BTAs most likely would not fit under WTO law, because it is 
unlikely that they would be the least trade restrictive measure; 
and e) if BTAs are feasible they will most likely be difficult to 
administer or enforce.
Independent from considerations of protectionism and 
transparency, BTAs could be a threat to Latin America through 
the pressure from foreign markets, in this case pushing towards 
a low carbon economy. Other such pressure is embodied in the 
October 2009 Loi Grenelle 2 in France, which states that after 
January 2011, food imports will be regulated for carbon foot-
prints, and that for French exports GHG emissions must be 
reported and included in labeling.101
If a carbon BTA could be perfectly designed and admin-
istered, theoretically there would be no effect on the share of 
exports to the country imposing the BTA. It would still be almost 
equally as profitable to export to that country, and would just 
be more expensive to buy the goods within the country (from 
either domestic or international suppliers). Some demand would 
shift from the carbon heavy items to cheaper, carbon-light items, 
but an ideal BTA should not have a large effect on the export 
economy of the developing country. A perfectly designed system 
could have neutral pressure on the economy of Chile and other 
countries. However, the issue is whether or not such an ideal 
BTA could be unilaterally imposed.
For a BTA to be effective, accurate calculation of carbon 
footprints would be necessary. Moreover, considering the PPP 
and the Common but Differentiated Responsibility principle, 
the main question relates to who must pay the costs of carbon 
produced by production and transportation: the consumer or 
producer? In a competitive world economy, if the price of an 
input is raised uniformly, the end product must rise or else the 
producing firms would find a better use for their capital and stop 
making the product. It seems that making a producer pay for the 
carbon directly is an administratively easier way to differenti-
ate between production methods. These pressures, expressed by 
unilateral measures that should be avoided to address ecologi-
cal problems, could mean that mitigation obligations might pass 
from developed to developing countries, reversing the Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities principle.
Noting the passing of mitigation obligations in the unilat-
eral application of BTAs, former Chilean President Lagos, Spe-
cial UN Commissioner for Climate Change, proposed that, in 
addition to Chile’s conformity with unilateral requirements for 
exporting to the United States or France, exporters to develop-
ing countries should equally consider the transportation costs of 
their goods, and the transportation of those goods.102
However, from an environmental perspective, Chile should 
support BTAs because without them some high carbon indus-
tries might relocate to Chile, increasing the carbon footprint 
per capita disproportionately faster than would otherwise occur 
without carbon taxes in the developed countries. In early 2011, 
the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Christiana Figueres, 
warned the Americas have become “fossilized,” rather than using 
renewable energy, and mentioned that Chile has already reached 
levels of emissions of gases typical of European countries.103 
Where does the responsibility for the increased carbon footprint 
in Chile lie? Should it be considered the responsibility of Chile, 
or that of the countries that induced industries to relocate unnec-
essarily? As this problem demonstrates, any truly sustainable 
application of BTAs will require a multilateral approach, taking 
into consideration the complex interactions between the many 
participants in the global trading system.
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international and domestic environmental law. The program engages law students 
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